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ABSTRACT 
We implement techniques of graph theory to international trade in order to empirically 
inspect the international system of trade. Examining macro and submacro levels of the 
international system of trade from 1962-2003, we find the presence of a Scale-Free 
Network with a Multiscalar Hierarchy. Such structures are resilient to bottom-up 
economic collapse, but are susceptible to top-down and horizontal economic failures. 
Our findings are based upon an especially novel approach for examining submacro 
systems, applying latent community identification analysis to identify trading 
communities that are not necessarily formalized or institutionalized as trading blocs. 
Following this analysis, we examine the role of international institutions in the 
international trade network, specifically considering macro level institutions for stability 
solutions and examining the effects of joining a trade bloc. We find evidence that 
supports the intergovernmentalist framework, whereby certain types of trade blocs seem 
to succeed while others fail, leading to different results in integration and unification. 
Thesis Supervisor: Nazli Choucri 
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GLOSSARY 
Balance ofpower System: A macro level system where several Hubs interact with one 
another to form the upper echelon of trade partnerships. Such a system shows 
remarkable homophily between the traders. 
Clique: Also known as a community, is a group of countries. 
Clustering Coefficient: Given three countries, A, B, and C, where A and B trade and B 
and C trade, the clustering coefficient is the likelihood that A and C trade. 
Contagion: Also known as cascading failure, refers to the spread of economic failure 
throughout the international economic system. 
Core-Periphery Hierarchy: A Hierarchical structure with a very rigid and top-down 
structure. 
Degrees: A measure of the number of relationships a node enjoys. 
Degree ofseparation: The minimum number of edges between two nodes. 
Directed Edge: An edge with at least one flow traversing between two nodes. 
Egalitarian Network: A network where all nodes have equal relationships and numbers of 
relationships. 
Equal-Dependent Submacro System: A submacro system where all nodes have roughly 
equal relationships, and numbers of relationships. 
Gatekeeper: A country that bridges a connection between two submacro groups. 
Graph: Also known as a network, is a representation of a system. 
Hierarchy: The ordering of countries in the international system. Several Hierarchies are 
possible; we find that a Multiscalar Hierarchy best describes the international system of 
trade. 
Homophily: The level and strength of interconnections in a network. 
Hub: A node that is more important to the structure of the network than most other nodes. 
Interdependence: Interconnections between two or more countries. 
k-Clique: Communities where all nodes satisfy a minimum threshold of partnership 
through their connections with other nodes in that clique. 
Latent Clique: A grouping that has not necessarily been formalized or distinguished by a 
pact or by geographic characteristics. 
Local Team Hierarchy: Contains several Gatekeepers, but nodes primarily follow a top- 
down Hierarchy of trade relationships. 
Macro Level Approach: An approach that examines all nodes in the system relative to 
one another. 
Micro Level Approach: An approach that examines dyadic, or bilateral, relationships in 
the system. 
Multi-Dependent Submacro System: A submacro system with more than one Hub and 
more than one Spoke. 
Multiscalar Hierarchy: A Hierarchy between Random, Random Interdivisional, Core- 
Periphery and Local Team. It is the most basic top-down hierarchical structure. 
Node: Also known as a vertex, is a singular actor in a system. 
Pure-Dependent Submacro System: A submacro system with a singular Hub and several 
Spoke countries. 
Random Hierarchy: A Hierarchy that is not necessarily governed by top-down trade 
relationships. 
Random Interdivisional Hierarchy: Apparent top-down relationships, but horizontal 
interactions are prevalent as well. 
Random Network: A network with a Gaussian degree distribution. As contrasted to an 
Egalitarian Network or a Scale-Free Network. 
Scale-Free Network: A network with a Power-Law degree distribution. A Scale-Free 
Network contains Hubs and Spokes and its presence suggests that subsystem 
relationships are important to understanding the hierarchy of the macro system. The 
international system of trade is a Scale-Free Network. 
Spoke: A node that is less important to the system structure than a Hub. 
Spring Embedding Function: A type of energy minimization for displaying graphs. A 
spring embedding function minimizes the visual size of the edges between the nodes 
while maintaining a certain amount of space between each node. 
Submacro Level Approach: An approach where we examine the relationships between 
countries that take place between more than two nations, but fewer than all nations. 
System: "An interconnection of components, devices, or subsystems" (Oppenheim, 
Wilsky, and Nawab, 1 997: 3 8). 
Trade Bloc: Also known as a trade group, is a formalized, or institutionalized group of 
countries that have preferential trade agreements with one another. 
Undirected Edge: A simple relationship between two nodes. 
CHAPTER 1: A NEW APPROACH TO EXAMINING THE 
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 
Throughout the early 1990s, several countries in Eastern Asia - including 
Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore and South Korea - enjoyed 
incredibly rapid economic growth. International organizations such as the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund hailed the economic success as nothing short of a 
wonder, an Asian economic miracle (World Bank, 1993; Stiglitz and Yusuf, 2001). 
In July of 1997, the bubble burst as an economic crisis ravaged these so-called 
Asian Tigers. Exports declined, foreign investment shrunk, a decline in earnings set in, 
and economic growth slowed (Yusuf, 2001). The causes of the economic collapse are 
still debated today: investors with a "herd mentality" were spooked by IMF threats to 
Indonesia due to asymmetric information, (Radelet and Sachs, 1998); struggles in the 
Thai real estate and financial sectors spread to economic problems in other areas in the 
region (Yusuf, 2001); even the Malaysian Prime Minister had an opinion, arguing that 
massive currency speculation by George Soros gutted the Malaysian economy, hurting 
surrounding economies (Billington, 1999). The list of causes goes on and on. 
While identifying the causes of the economic crisis are well worth pursuing, what 
is equally interesting is the way in which policy-makers responded. Common to the 
mindsets of the policy-makers was that this economic down-turn needed to be contained. 
The governing logic was simple to understand: national economies are highly integrated 
with one another, and if a group of economies sputter, the decline may cause the larger 
economic system to sputter as well, or even collapse. In other words, depression in the 
international economic system is somehow contagious. 
Thinking about international systems such as the international economic system is 
nothing new. Scholars in International Relations (IR) are purposefully engaged in 
working to identify and understand the structures of such international systems (Waltz, 
1954; Rosencrance, 1963; Walt, 1985; Kauhan,  1997). Over the past sixty years, a rich 
corpus of theory has been merged with rational choice and empirical analysis to offer 
many insights into each dimension of world politics. Typically, analysis of the ways in 
which nations interact with one another has proceeded along three different levels 
(Berton, 1969). In the first level, countries engage in bilateral relationships, forming 
micro systems, where two countries directly interact with and influence each other. Such 
interactions include bilateral trade, non-alliance wars, or migration flows in which only 
two countries are involved. In the second level, countries join in multilateral 
relationships, forming submacro systems. In such cases, a country would interact with a 
community of countries, greater than two, but less than the entire population of all of the 
nations of the world: they would interact with a subsystem of the overall international 
order.' Examples of such submacro systems include trade blocs, military alliances, and 
common money markets.' The third level involves relationships where a nation's 
interactions are controlled, influenced, and determined relative to its position among the 
rest of the nations of the world.3 Such international relationships are embodied in the 
macro system, or international order. These three levels of relationships are distinct, but 
not separate. Together, they influence the larger international system structure and shape 
the types of interactions between countries. 
A submacro system is a grouping of nations. Such a grouping can be geographically regional, a trade 
group, or a political alliance, for example. The term comes from Berton, 1969. 
As the reader will soon discover, in this thesis we seek to find latent submacro systems rather than 
manifest subsystems such as these. 
Interactions among nations may also affect each other's domestic systems. 
Integrative approaches across these levels tend to consider any two, but rarely all 
three, levels at once. Such a non-holistic perspective results from methodologies in IR 
typically focusing on thesis identification and testing where the principal goal is one of 
recognizing the primary cause of an effect; analyzing the intemational system requires 
systemic theory identification and testing, whereby one explains how changes and 
feedbacks in the system structure affect the conversion of inputs into outputs (Kaplan, 
1960: ~ i i i ) . ~  To put it more clearly, the goal of systems analysis is not necessarily to 
observe and test a causal theory, but it is instead intended to help the researcher observe 
the patterns of interactions among actors. One may be able to perform thesis testing after 
identifying the system structure. 
While scholars in IR have investigated the international system, sociologists, 
scientists, and engineers have increasingly engaged in studies of systems pertinent to 
their own domains and disciplines (Newman, 2003). As scholars recognized the 
commonality of studying systems, a new mode of analysis grew out of their 
collaborations known as complexity science, or graph theory? Graph theory now stands 
as a robust - but still developing - arena within academia. More importantly, graph 
theory offers a way of approaching the three levels of the intemational system at once, by 
using dyadic relationships to identify and explore submacro and macro system structures. 
For Kaplan, both thesis and systemic theory are elements of theory, and he stresses that theory should not 
be contained to thesis identification alone (1957: xiii). 
Complexity science and graph theory are also known as network theory. While the terms are used 
interchangeably throughout the literature (see Newman 2003 for example), we predict that in time, network 
theory will come to classify relationships where flows between actors are involved, while graph theory will 
describe relationships between various actors. If we accept such a dichotomy, both the hndamental 
concepts and the mathematics of network theory and graph theory are nevertheless tremendously similar, 
making such a distinction a moot point. However, since we are primarily focused upon relationships of 
trade rather than flows of trade, we shall describe our approach as a graph theoretic approach. 
Not surprisingly, one of the chief pursuits within graph theory is analyzing system 
stability and the spread of system instability. Albert and Barabisi examine the stability 
of certain types of systems and networks in the context of the Internet and the World 
Wide Web (2002); Maslov and Sneppen investigate stability in protein networks (2002); 
Dunne, Williams, and Martinez consider system stability in the network of food webs 
(2002). Indeed, while IR scholars such as Robert E. Keohane complain that predictability 
is elusive as "[tloo many factors interact in complex ways to produce the results we see," 
including "[rlandom shocks [that] disrupt the system," graph theorists do not shy away 
from this challenge (1 997: 150). Instead, they embrace it. The attitude that complexity is 
something that needs be better understood, rather than something that needs to be 
avoided, guides our project. 
Purposes of Project 
In order to better understand system stability, system instability, and contagion 
conditions, we seek to identify the structure of the international system. Recognizing that 
the international system includes a diverse and diffuse set of relationships, we seek to 
identify the structure in terms of one type of interaction: international trade! Further 
recognizing that a whole host of non-country actors - including individuals, grassroots 
movements, multinational corporations, and other non-governmental organizations - all 
affect international politics, we contain our analysis of the international system 
exclusively to relationships between countries. While other elements of the international 
system are important, nations form the backbone of international politics, and it is their 
6 In Chapter 2, we explain why we chose trade over other measures. To be clear, the Asian financial crisis 
was not caused by changes in trade, but rather by changes in capital and investment flows. Modeling such 
other economic structures would also be a useful and worthwhile project. 
relationships among themselves and with the overall structure that we are chiefly 
interested in identifying (Gilpin, 1 98 1 : 26; Kaufman, 1997). 
In order to fully understand the international system of trade, one needs to 
consider its subsidiary levels: the micro (relationships between two countries), the 
submacro (relationships between more than two countries, but fewer than all countries), 
and the macro (relationships between all countries). In analyzing trade, much work has 
already been conducted across all three levels. Micro / dyadic / bilateral relationships 
have been examined by several scholars, most notably by Beck, King, and Zeng (2000; 
2004) and by Bennett and Starn (2000).~ At the opposite end of the spectrum, macro 
relationships have been considered by Waltz (1954) and Walt (1985), to name just two of 
many theorists. And between micro and macro, submacro relationships have been 
studied in terms of geographic country groupings (Schirm, 2002), in terms of political 
and military alliances (Krebs, 1999), in terms of culture (Huntington, 1996), and in terms 
of economic bonds, especially by way of trade blocs (Mansfield and Milner, 1999). 
Few studies ever examine the common nature of these submacro systems, 
however (Berton, 1969). These submacro systems affect their member countries, they 
affect the macro level, and they affect each other, and yet the best research in this arena 
has compared submacro groupings only within their contexts. One can find research that 
compares the European Union (EU) and the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(Abbott, 2000), or research that examines political alliances (Kupchan, 1988), but one is 
unlikely to find research that compares Asian country relationships to the South African 
Customs Union, or even research on non-formalized trading communities - where the 
involved nations do cooperate increasingly with each other without the benefits of an 
Each of these works use micro relationships to explore the causes and consequences of dyadic conflict. 
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official trade alliance. As a result, our understanding of inter-national interactions at the 
submacro level pales in comparison to our understanding of interactions at the micro and 
macro  level^.^ In this project, we seek to overcome this condition by observing submacro 
relationships embedded within dyadic re la t i~nshi~s.~ 
To identify these several latent submacro groupings of countries, we shall take 
full advantages of recent developments in graph theory, especially utilizing advances in 
community identification analysis. Most networks typically have regions where the 
components are increasingly interconnected relative to the rest of the network, and these 
regions are known as cliques, or clusters (Palla, et al., 2005).'O For our purposes, such 
cliques are nonformalized, submacro groupings of countries. ' 
Why consider latent cliques at all? In Figure 1, a friendship network of children 
in a US school is shown (Newman, 2003; picture courtesy of James ~ o o d ~ ) . ' ~  The light 
dots represent white children; the dark dots represent black children; the shaded dots 
represent children of other racial backgrounds.13 Notice that while children do divide 
The hyphen placed in the term "inter-national" is to draw attention to the fact that nations compete in an 
anarchic setting, with no all-powerful super-organization mediating actions. As a result, it is not fair to say 
that we are in a state of globalization, as we are in a state of inter-nationalization (Hirst and Thompson, 
2002). 
In earlier dmfts of this thesis, we described the latent cliques as "embedded." However, in The Great 
Transformation, Polanyi frequently refers to the economic system being embedded in the interactions of a 
larger international system, meaning that it is not autonomous. This concept of embeddedness has been 
adopted by many others, including Granovetter, Ruggie, and Evans (Block, 2001). To avoid conhsion, 
from now on, we will use the term "latent" to describe non-formalized clusters in the international trade 
system. 
lo Cliques are also known as clusters, communities, and groupings (Derknyi, et al., 2005). 
By a nonforrnalized grouping, we mean a grouping that is tied together by the fact that they trade with 
one another, not necessarily by geography, explicit trade bloc status, or culture. 
l2 Newman's "Structure and Function of Complex Networks" represents the best compendium of network 
theory (2003). Citing 429 other references, Newman leaves few stones unturned. 
l3  The hard copy of the thesis will be printed in black-and-white; the electronic version will include color. 
In the electronic version, white children are represented with yellow dots, black children with blue dots, 
and children of other racial backgrounds with green dots. 
themselves along racial lines, what emerge are four distinct clusters - or communities of 
children - suggesting that some other divide beyond race exists as well.14 
Figure 1: Friendship Relationships Between Children in a US School. From Newman, 2003, 
Courtesy of James Moody 
As a thought exercise, let us consider these dots as countries instead of school 
children. Each color would then represent exclusive participation in a certain explicit 
trading bloc (such as N m A  or the EU) as opposed to another trading bloc. However, 
the common divide within each of the trading groups would not be apparent if 
participation in a trading group were all that was being considered. Thus, the benefit of 
identifying each clique in the dataset is that it allows us to observe groupings that are not 
typically studied. For illustrative purposes, in Figure 2 we have provided one such latent 
14 One may suspect that this divide is perhaps one of gender or class, but in actuality, it is a product of an 
age divide. 
submacro clique from 1984.15 Notice that the seven countries included come from 
different trade groups, different cultures, different political alliances, and different 
continents? To be clear, the value of considering latent trade cliques is that they are 
determined exclusively in terms of trade interactions, without relying upon any prior 
assumptions about identities or classifications. 
Germany 
Figure 2: A Latent Submacro Clique in the International System 
Finally, if our primary purpose in this project is to capture the structures and 
functions of the international system in terms of trade in order to understand the stability 
of trade, the latent purpose of this project is to demonstrate that graph theory should find 
a welcoming home in IR, and within political science at large.I7 To this end, we discuss 
l 5  We shall discuss how this latent clique was identified and constructed in Chapters 3 and 4. 
16 A cynic might point out that these countries all belong to the Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development (OECD). However, in 1984, South Korea was not a member of this group and would not 
join for another twelve years. However, perhaps being so intertwined with these richer countries did help 
South Korea achieve OECD status, further demonstrating the benefits of examining latent submacro 
cliques. 
l7 This is not to imply that graph theory has not been used before in political science. Indeed, as we shall 
show in the next chapter, its beginnings are rooted in political science. 
the current state of graph theory in IR and political science, and we also speculate about 
&re possibilities for graph theory across our field? 
Thesis Layout 
The thesis is laid out as follows. In Chapter 2, we examine the history of graph 
theory, especially in the context of political science. Graph theory was born and first 
nurtured by sociologists and political scientists; however it has spent much of its 
adolescence in the company of scientists and engineers. As a result, applications of graph 
theory in the social sciences have predominantly been constrained to analyzing 
relationships between people, while incorporations of graph theory in the hard sciences 
have thoroughly pervaded physics (Albert and Barabbi, 2002), computer science 
(Huberman, 200 I), and especially biology (Anderson and May, 199 1 ; Shen-Orr, Milo, 
Mangan, and Alon, 2002). 
In Chapter 2, we also explore the previous research pertaining to structures of the 
international system. Many structures of international systems have been presented in 
theoretical terms, but few have been tested. We shall examine and consider several of 
these propositions, as well as one of the leading empirical examinations which tests the 
propositions of systems theory. We shall also examine various literatures on 
international submacro systems. Several types of submacro systems abound, both in 
theory and in reality, and we shall briefly review several of these structures before calling 
Throughout our speculations, we shall offer citations for the reader to follow up where graph theory are 
being employed. 
19 The selection of each of these citations is illustrative, but by no means random. Albert and Barabasi have 
written one of the foremost reviews of network theory in physics; Huberman's book is entitled The Laws of 
the Web, and discusses network theory in context to one of the greatest contributions fiom computer 
science: the World Wide Web; Anderson and May's book discusses networks in the context of one of the 
most pressing issues in biology: the spread of infectious diseases; and Shen-Orr, et al.'s piece explores how 
various proteins interact to express genes. Examples are all described in Newman, 2003. 
for the analysis that cuts across regional, political, cultural, and economic taxonomies of 
submacro systems. 
In Chapter 3, we empirically examine the macro structure of the international 
trade system. Analyzing all of the major trade relationships between countries from 
1962-2003, we find that a Scale-Free Network best captures and explains the dynamics of 
international trade?' A Scale-Free Network suggests that certain countries are 
tantamount to the stability of the system relative to other countries and that a hierarchy 
exists among actors. A Scale-Free Network also suggests that subsystems, or in our case, 
submacro systems, play an important role in the dynamics of the overall system. 
In Chapter 4, we seek to empirically identify these submacro systems. Using one 
of the most recently developed algorithms in graph theory for latent community 
identification (and the one best-suited for our purposes of identifying cliques of 
countries), we present several of these cliques from the years 1962, 1982, and 2002.2' 
We find that while the composition of cliques may change, several core properties are 
inherent to these groupings, which is the subject of Chapter 5. 
In Chapter 5, we examine the differences of various submacro systems in the 
context of the hierarchical possibilities of the international system. A range of submacro 
systems exist, with different forms of interdependence uniting these multilateral 
groupings. We conclude fiom our submacro analysis that the international trade system 
follows a Multiscalar Hierarchy, one possible hierarchy of a Scale-Free Network. We 
20 A major trade relationship is defined as one in which a large portion of a country's overall trade comes 
fiom or goes to another country. While compiling the datasets, we found that several countries share minor 
and insignificant amounts of trade flows. In order to capture the true structure of trade, we established a 
cutoff to discern minor fiom major trade. For a further explanation of how the cutoff was designed and 
implemented, see Chapter 2 and Appendix A on data methodology. 
21 The algorithm we select comes fiom Palla, et al., 2005. 
also discuss the ramifications of such an international system for economic stability and 
for economic coercion. 
In Chapter 6, we introduce international institutions to the discussion of economic 
stability. We examine institutions both as a source of stability for the international 
system (through an analysis of macro institutions), and as a source for improving member 
country conditions (through an analysis of formalized trade blocs, which are submacro 
institutions). 
We conclude in Chapter 7 with a summary of the major findings. Among the 
major findings is that we identify the presence of a Scale-Free macro system, with a 
whole myriad set of different latent submacro cliques, which suggest a Multiscalar 
Hierarchy of the international trade system. We also find that trade blocs are most 
effective at improving all member nations when they resemble Egalitarian Network as 
opposed to a Scale-Free Network. We conclude with some parting thoughts about 
possible future areas of IR research based upon systems theory, graph theory, and 
especially based upon international trade. This thesis represents only the tip of the 
iceberg in terms of the tools and datasets that have been brought together, and in this 
chapter we intend to lay out other possible directions for research. 
CHAPTER 2: GRAPH THEORY AND INTERNATIONAL 
SYSTEMS THEORY: THEN AND NOW 
Overview 
Graph theory is also known as complex systems science, and there are several 
complex systems present in social structures (Newman, 2003; Marsden, 2002; Piepers, 
2006) .~~  We shall examine the history of graph theory in order to show that graph theory 
can also be usellly applied to several different areas of political science. We then turn 
to international systems theory literature to see whether graph theory may give us any 
leverage in testing these theories. We discuss theory and previous research of the 
submacro system, calling for analyses which consider latent country communities rather 
than pre-defined communities. We close by examining the shortcomings of De Mesquita 
and Lalman's empirical analysis of the systemic effects on conflict in the international 
system to identify how we may improve our own analysis (1988). 
A Brief History of Graph Theory 
One of the earliest forms of graph theory within the social sciences was the 
observance of the small world phenomenon. The small world phenomenon was first 
considered by political scientist Ithiel de Sola Pool and mathematician Manfred Kochen 
in the 1950s (Pool and Kochen, 1978).~' Pool and Kochen argued that through familial 
22 These examples are illustrative: Newman explicitly states that complex systems exist in social structures, 
Marsden lists several possible sociological studies that could benefit Erom graph theoretic methodologies, 
and Piepers applies graph theory to international relationships. 
23 Pool and Kochen worked together for over twenty years, but did not co-author a published piece together 
until 1978. In "Contacts and Influence," the first ever article in the journal Social Networks, the abstract 
explains the story: 
"This essay raises more questions than it answers. In first draft, which we have only 
moderately revised, it was written about two decades ago and has been circulating in 
manuscript since then. (References to recent literature have, however, been added.) It was 
not published previously because we raised so many questions that we did not know how 
to answer; we hoped to eventually solve the problems and publish. The time has come to 
ties, friendships, or acquaintances, any two people in the world are connected through a 
minimal number of links (Etheredge, 2006). In terns of political science, the 
applications of Pool's and Kochen's research were mainly contained to the comparativist 
literature - seeking to identify such conditions as the distance a message would have to 
travel from the average American to the president, or how an idea could spread among 
bureaucracies - but could eventually be applied across the various domains of political 
science. As time progressed, Pool's and Kochen's notion of a small world was accepted 
amazingly well by popular culture: their work gave rise to the hypothesis that all people 
were connected within six acquaintances, which in turn inspired a play entitled Six 
Degrees of Separation (Guare, 1990), and more recently, the title of the popular book Six 
Degrees: The Science of A Connected Age (Watts, 2 0 0 3 ) ~ ~ ~  Barab6sisi's Linked: The New 
Science of Networks, which explores degrees of separation across a whole range of 
disciplines, has also enjoyed large-scale popularity (2002). 
Since the time of Pool and Kochen, the small worldphenomenon has particularly 
manifested itself in comparative politics in the form of social capital. Robert Putnam 
defines social capital as the "features of social life - networks, norms, and trust - that 
enable participants to act together more effectively to pursue shared objectives" (Putnam, 
cut bait. With the publication of a new journal of human network studies, we offer our 
initial soundings and unsolved questions to the community of researchers which is now 
forming in this field. While a great deal of work has been done on some of these 
questions during the past 20 years, we do not feel that the basic problems have been 
adequately resolved" (Pool and Kochen, 1978: Abstract). 
Any true student of social capital would fully appreciate this piece. 
24 The history of six degrees is actually more nuanced. In his book, Watts recognizes Pool and Kochen 
were the first to attempt to academically investigate the small worldphenomenon, doing so in the 1950s. 
Their work inspired Stanley Milgram to conjecture that the maximum number of degrees among any two 
randomly selected people in the population is six, technically making Milgram the father of the theory of 
six degrees of separation. However, without Pool and Kochen, "Milgram would have been off doing 
another experiment" (Watts, 2003 : 160- 1 6 1). 
1995: 664-665)? And social capital may explain several important elements in the study 
of politics. In Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Northern Italy, Putnam 
argues that social capital may stimulate the formation of democracy (1993). In its 
essence, Putnarn's concept of social capital relies upon gauging the smaN world 
phenomenon across societies. 
Recently, social scientists and business researchers have also tried to measure the 
fiequency of interactions among individuals to measure the pervasiveness of various 
ideas (Choucri, et al., 2006; Shive, 2006):~ In order to gauge the fkequency and quality 
of interactions, researchers will estimate interactions using epidemic modeling (Sterman, 
2000).*~ Knowing the approximate fiequency of infectivity and the approximate number 
of affected individuals, they then can generate an approximation of the number and 
amount of interactions within a population. Such a methodology could be especially 
usehl in testing Putnam's theory of social capital and democracy. 
Research in systems is also nothing new to political science. Within our domain 
of IR, Morton A. Kaplan defines a system as "a set of variables so related, in 
contradistinction to its environment, that describable behavioral regularities characterize 
the internal relationships of the variables to each other and the external relationships of 
the set of individual variables to combinations of external variables" (Kaplan, 1960: 4). 
25 Putnam has defined social capital many times and in many venues, always consistently. The choice of 
taking the definition fiom "Tuning In, Tuning Out: The Strange Disappearance of Capital in America" is 
not random, however. This talk was for prepared as the 1995 Ithiel de Sola Pool Lecture. Strangely, 
Putnam seems reticent to adopt tools of network theory, preferring instead to employ traditional empirical 
and qualitative methodologies. 
26 Shive shows that an epidemic model of investor behavior may explain price fluctuations of various 
stocks. She does not use diseases and infectivity rates, but another way of getting around the social capital 
methodology nightmare without using disease (particularly pertinent to developed countries), would be to 
inspect infectivity rates in terms of the stock market, or in terms of fashion. 
27 Sterman discusses the possibilities of epidemic modeling in the context of applications for business, but 
he gives much credit to network sociologists (2000). 
A system can be defined more succinctly as "an interconnection of components, devices, 
or subsystems" (Oppenheim, Wilsky, and Nawab, 1997: 38).28 Such a definition keeps 
the thrust of Kaplan's notion of system intact, while more concretely explaining the 
elements which might compose a system. 
A graph is simply the representation of such a system?9 Therefore, graph theory 
refers to the study of these systems. More specifically, graph theory "is a branch of 
mathematics concerned with how networks can be encoded and their properties 
measured," while network theory tends to refer to flows across these networks and among 
the various actors (Rodrigue, 2005: Chapter 2).30 Since Pool and Kochen's speculations 
and musings more than fifty years ago, graph theory has rapidly developed, especially 
within the hard sciences. Over much of this time period, the methodology of graph 
theory was primarily visually-based, with scientists examining a network image to extract 
findings (Newman, 2003). And visualizations are still one of the key aspects of graph 
theory." However, contemporary researchers in graph theory have added to this 
paradigm of visual-inspection by introducing various statistical techniques.32 
This inclusion of statistical methods to graph theory has been partially driven by 
the advent of computational analysis - one cannot gainllly eye-ball a network composed 
of millions or billions of components - and partly by the emergence of domains devoted 
28 Defining terms is especially important in political science: this shall be exemplified fiuther in the chapter 
with our discussion of previous usages of the term "system." 
29 Network theory involves actually identifying and mapping the links between various actors, and studying 
what these links mean in the context of the system. 
30 The definition of graph theory is provided by Rodrigue; the observation that network theory tends to 
focus on flows is our observation fiom the literature and is certainly not hard-and-fast as network theory 
and graph theory are often used synonymously with each other. As we mentioned in fn. 5, we expect this 
distinction to become more pronounced in proceeding years. 
3' Ortiz discusses the usefulness of analysis through visualizations throughout political science (2005). 
" Visualization-as-method is also undergoing a similar catharsis as researchers are gainfully examining the 
ramifications of various spatial layouts in the context of viewer's perceptions. For a recent summary of this 
literature, see McGrath and Blythe, 2004. 
to analyzing especially complex networks, and particularly the domain of computational 
biology (ibid). In computational biology, researchers have been trying to capture the 
structure of the system of genes and their relationships with proteins, a system of 
tremendous size and complexity (Palla, et al., 2005). While the international system 
clearly does not approach the complexity of protein-gene dynamics, statistical tools are 
nonetheless useful, and for our purposes both visual and statistical tools of graph theory 
are appropriate. 
Systems Analysis in lnterna tional Relations 
In Man, the State, and War, Kenneth Waltz introduces three images for analyzing 
IR (1954). Each image includes an area of study that can affect world politics. The first 
image includes individuals, the second image includes the domestic institutions of the 
nation, and the third image involves the international structure, or system. Waltz's two 
chief goals are to justify realism in the context of international politics (that nations are 
driven by power-maximization rather than by simple desires for peace and harmony), and 
to stress the importance of research in the third image, and more broadly in understanding 
systemic patterns of IR. 
What Waltz meant by "system," however, is not the only understanding of the 
term prevalent in our literature. Scholars in IR have employed the concept of "system" in 
three different usages in IR theory, oftentimes promoting ambiguity and confusion, 
summarized in Table 1 (Goodman, 1965). The first usage, system-as-description, is 
when the tern is used to describe patterns of interactions between and among actors; 
typically nations are the identified actors. For example, nations go to war: the causes and 
consequences of these interactions give rise to a system. The second usage, system-as- 
explanation, suggests that actions are determined by pre-existing systemic explanations, 
oftentimes not justifying the specific cause of a pattern of behavior. Kondratiev waves 
would be an example of system-as-explanation, where wars are expected to be more 
prevalent every twenty years without any specific cause (Goldstein, 1988). In a recent 
paper about war between the great powers, Peipers uses graph theory to explain how 
system regularity suggests that individual actors and forces are inconsequential pieces in 
the causes of great power war (2006).~~ System-as-method describes when the term is 
used to capture special methodologies to describe the international system in the context 
of interactions among actors. For instance, when game theory was first introduced to IR, 
the new methodology was described as one that would help capture the international 
system (Goodman, 1965: 260). 
Table 2: Usages of System in IR Theory. Adapted from Goodman, 1965: italics added by Goodman 
Usage 
S ystem-as- 
Description 
S ystem-as- 
Explanation 
System-as- 
Method 
33 Unfortunately, Peipers uses statistical tools of network theory that are most u se l l  for large numbers of 
observations. Even if one looks over a period of 450 years, as Peipers does, there have only been 97 great 
power wars. Also, Peipers argues that there is some sort of system that causes these great power wars, and 
that this system does not include individual. 
Characterized B'Q.. . 
"an arrangement of he 
actors. . .in which 
interactions are 
patterned and 
identifiablev 
"a particular 
mangemeent in which 
the nature of the 
at~angement makes it 
die major variable" 
"application of 
special of 
approaches: 
methodologies, or 
analytical concepts to 
the data of 
intenlittiorla1 politics" 
Emmples 
James M. Rosenau: "a system is considered to exist in an 
environment and to be composed of parts, which, through 
interaction, are in relation to each other. Consequently, a system 
has a sa-ucture and encompassed processes though which it is 
either sustained or changed." 
Charles McClellmd: "Since both principal actors occup similar 
positions and experience similar difficulties, they might drift 
gradually toward collaboration, except h t  such a movement is 
blocked by #?e essential curtfldct strrrctttre of the internatioz~aI 
sjastem ." 
"[tlhe particular 'systems\itilized in Sysebu-as-hf ethod are often 
drawn fiom other disciplines and applied to international politics. 
hlcClellandls homeostatic equilibrium 'systernkoncept derives 
fiorn biology, George Lipska derives his concept of equilibrium 
'systems' from economics; and R. N. Rosencrance finds 'systems" 
in rriecharlics arialogous to those of politics." 
To be clear, Kaplan's definition of system that we chose at the beginning of this 
section is one of system-as-description. For the purposes of this project, such a definition 
is the most appropriate. While we do use methodologies extracted from graph theory that 
are new to political science and IR, the system we are concerned with is not primarily the 
method. We are chiefly concerned with identifying the structures and substructures of 
the international trade system. If our work is so fortunate as to see h r e  developments, 
it may give rise to system-as-explanation work, where the structures can be used to 
explain relations and interactions. 
Not surprisingly, with such a heavy focus on systemic analysis, methods in 
system dynamics have also become more common across our field (Choucri, et al., 2006; 
Lofdahl, 2002; Robbins, 2005)." In Figure 3, we include a theoretical system dynamics 
model of insurgency activity and recruitment. 
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Figure 3: A Conceptual System-Dynamics Model of Insurgent Activity and Recruitment (from 
Choucri, et al., 2006) 
" Again, the examples are illustrative rather than exhaustive. Of these, the book by Lofdahl is probably 
most closely related to the topic at hand: in Environmental Impacts of Globalization and Trade: A Systems 
Study, Lofdahl highlights the negatives of increased trade (2002). 
Notice that most of the components of the system are not specifically actors, but 
instead include a variety of concepts. While the purposes of system dynamics and graph 
theory are similar - both seek to capture and understand the nature of systems - graph 
theory tends to be contained to understanding relationships between actors rather than 
relationships between concepts. Graph theory and system dynamics are separate 
methodological approaches. 
It should also be noted that neural network analysis and graph theory are 
qualitatively distinct. In neural network analysis, the goal is to predict a set of results, 
typically by bypassing the causal pattern. In graph theory, the goal is to identify the 
structure of relationships between the actors to understand the system structure. As we 
have discussed, graph theory is a method of system-as-description. Oppositely, causality- 
based prediction remains the primary goal of neural network analysis. 
Despite their differences, approaches to integrating IR with neural network 
analysis do yield an important lesson for those who wish to introduce a new methodology 
to IR: introducing new methodologies to IR occasionally draws skepticism and criticism. 
For instance, to better understand the nature of international conflict, Beck, King, and 
Zeng designed a neural network model for predicting the frequency of conflict among 
nations (2000). Working at a time when neural networks were still in a primitive stage, 
Beck, King, and Zeng demonstrated the promise of neural network analysis by comparing 
their findings to findings derived from traditional empirical tools, most notably including 
regression models.35 Their proposal of utilizing neural network analysis to predict 
3 5 Neural network analysis is rapidly developing, but we fully expect that in several years neural network 
analysis circa 2006 will also be described as "primitive." Beck, King, and Zeng explain the development 
conflict generated significant backlash from traditional, regression-focused, empirical 
researchers for implying that a new statistical methodology may offer better insight (De 
Marchi, Gelpi, and Grynaviski, 2004). In response, Beck, King, and Zeng convincingly 
demonstrate that neural networking does have value by re-creating a successll neural 
network model, in turn proving that the implementation of new methodologies to 
consider old questions is a worthwhile activity (2004). We agree with Beck, King, and 
Zeng that IR can benefit from the investigation of novel methods. 
As we discussed earlier, it is not fair to say that graph theory is an entirely new 
approach to political science, but graph theory today is so very different from what it was 
in Pool and Kochen's time. Modern-day graph theory has been used in limited fashion in 
IR, but for the most part, it has not been used to examine the international system as a 
whole. Peipers' article on great power wars shaping the international system is the 
obvious exception, where Peipers searches for tipping points for war among the great 
powers (2006). However, Peipers only considers the great power countries rather than all 
the countries of the world when fiaming his international system. Within international 
trade analysis, Krernpel and Pliirnper have utilized graph theory and gravity modeling, 
but have only included forty-five countries in their models.36 Furthermore, Krempel and 
Pliimper use graph theory primarily to conduct micro system analysis, re-confirming the 
Gravity Theory model, whereby trade is more likely to occur between two countries 
when the two countries are geographically closer together or the economies are large 
of neural network analysis in the context of their project when they redo their experiments in subsequent 
work, finding that their methods used in 2000 need to be updated when employed in 2004 (2004). 
36 Gravity modeling is the practice of taking into account geographic distances when examining the causes 
of international trade, usually at the dyadic, or micro-level; Krempel and Pliirnper offer several 
visualizations of their forty-five country network with geographic weighting: 
ht~://~~~.cmu.edu/ioss/content/articles/volume4/Krem~e1Plumper~files/m5countw.htm1 (Accessed May, 
2006). 
(2002). To be clear, they do not claim to be examining the structure of the international 
system, but do implement tools which could help us understand relationships that are 
more complex than simply dyadic relationships. Their work offers little traction in 
examining the submacro and macro levels of international systems. Fortunately, IR 
theory does have a set of propositions that could guide this work. 
Scoping the Topology of International Systems 
In our conception, the international system includes several submacro systems 
interacting with a larger, macro system.37 However, the concept of the international 
system is distinct from the concept of a world system. The typical definition of a world 
system in the context of political science is "the social organization of the human 
species" (Modelski, 2000: 25). World system theorists are concerned with identifying 
patterns of group behavior that hold over long-term time periods and across different 
organizational hierarchies. In contrast, to understand the international system is to 
understand the contemporary version of one part of the world system: one in which 
nations and their actions and interactions drive international politics. 
There are several overlapping concepts between the world system and the 
international system, and understanding the international system can shape our 
understanding of the world system. Denemark, Friedman, Gills, and Modelski wonder 
whether center-periphery hierarchies have always dictated social organizations and 
whether they differ in various subsystems of the world system (2000: xvi). In the next 
chapter, we shall examine the center-periphery hierarchies of the international trade 
37 These subsystems include relationships at the macro level where all countries are involved, relationships 
between two countries, which are micro level relationships in IR, and relationships between more than two, 
but less than all countries, which are relationships at the submacro level (Berton, 1969). These 
relationships include both cooperation and conflict. 
system and how it has changed (or not changed) over recent time. Two other world 
systems theorists, Chase-Dunn and Hall, note that all world hierarchical networks exhibit 
cyclical "pulsations in the spatial extent of interaction networks" (2000: 100). This 
would suggest that in the context of the international system, nations undulate in their 
relations with others and in their participation in an international order. 
In order to fully understand the international system, we also need to understand 
various other subsystems within it. One especially important misconception about 
analyzing international systems is perhaps best exemplified by J. David Singer in "The 
Level-of-Analysis Problem in International Relations" (Singer, 196 1). Representing the 
backlash to the domain's call for more research in the third image, Singer explains that 
"[tlhus, we tend to move, in a system-oriented model, away from notions implying much 
national autonomy and independence of choice and toward a more deterministic 
orientation" (ibid: 81). While Singer is simply voicing the concern that analyzing IR in 
an international systems perspective may be hdamentally flawed (he does not 
necessarily adhere to this position), understanding the world as a system is not a bad 
approach. Such an approach does not mean we ignore domestic and internal variations 
among separate nations: indeed if anything, we must especially focus on such 
components, devices, and subsystems if we are to understand how the larger international 
system works.38 Individual decision-makers and other exogenous elements do exist and 
interact with the world system, and understanding the consequences of such elements is 
crucial to understanding the international system. In this project we strive to maintain a 
38 Another weakness of Peipers' findng is that he refuses to recognize the importance of such components 
in his international system. He explains that the pattern of his international system is such that regardless 
of the leaders or of the institutions involved, great powers will go to war. In fact, one of the weaknesses of 
his conclusions is that he does not consider that the pattern of change is unfolding at the leadership-level or 
at the institutional level and is simply manifesting itself with great power wars (2006). 
balance between the international system and the international submacro systems, but we 
recognize the limitations of simply examining international trade without considering 
individuals, non-governmental organizations, or multinational corporations. 
Macro International Systems Theory 
For our purposes, we analyze the international trade system in terms of one large, 
macro meta-system and in terms of various international submacro systems. Such macro 
meta-systems can be considered as variants of the international order. Kaplan offers six 
such states of equilibrium of the international order; note that only one macro system can 
exist at any given time (1 957: Ch. 2): 
1. The Balance of Power System: Exists in a null political subsystem (anarchy). 
There are at least five "essential" actors / nations in a Balance of Power 
System that implement the "essential" rules which govern the characteristic 
behavior of the population of actors. 
2. The Loose Bipolar System: Formalized, supranational actors as well as 
national actors both participate in such a system. Two subclasses of 
supranational actors must exist to form the bipolar system. During the time of 
the Cold War, NATO and the Communist blocs formed a Loose Bipolar 
System. 
3. The Tight Bipolar System: Similar to the Loose Bipolar System except all 
national actors belong to one of the subclass supranational organizations. Such 
a system would resemble the international system during the Cold War if all 
of the members of the Third World had allied with NATO or the Communists. 
4. The Universal System: The previous three systems include an anarchic 
political order; the universal system assumes that national actors are governed 
by a universal actor. If the United Nations and the World Trade Organization 
had greater power in the contemporary international system, we would call 
our modern-day international system a Universal System. 
5. The Hierarchical System in Directive and Non-Directive Forms: The 
Hierarchical System is one in which a universal power rules directly over the 
people, with no independent national political systems. In its Non-Directive 
Form, the Hierarchical System is a world-wide democracy; in its Directive 
Form, the system is authoritarian. 
6. The Unit Veto System: The Unit Veto System can occur when either national 
actors or bloc actors control the system. The Unit Veto System stipulates that 
all members have the capability of destroying each other, suggesting that all 
members are equally powerhl. 
While Kaplan was writing in the 1950s and 1960s, understanding the macro 
international system again became popular following the end of the Cold Richard 
Ned Lebow observes that due to the collapse of the USSR, "prominent realists maintain 
that a shift is under way in the international system fiom bi- to multipolarity" (1994: 
249). For Lebow, a Multipolar System is most similar to a Balance of Power System, 
except that in a Multipolar System, anarchy could be supplanted by a universal actor. 
Contending that the paradigm of realism requires the condition of international anarchy, 
39 Between Kaplan and Lebow, several prominent scholars have considered the meta-structure of the 
international system, coming up with a whole slew of various orders. One system that deserves mentioning 
is that of Hegemonic System, where one national actor maintains stability across the international system. 
However, the Hegemonic System is really a derivative of the Universal System. The key readings on the 
Hegemonic System are Gilpin, 1 98 1 and Keohane, 1 984. 
Lebow calls for theorists to explicitly state which system paradigm their theories exist 
within, and to search for theories that would hold across multiple systems. Lebow 
explains that theories with carry-over capacity across the various types of international 
orders form the backbone of neorealism (ibid). 
Kaufman further examines the nature of international orders in the context of 
neorealism (1 997). Kaufman explains that simply because the twentieth century has been 
dominated by bipolar and multipolar systems does not mean that these are the only two 
such systems in existence. History is replete with examples where the international order 
is best described on a complete gradient, from Hegemony (Universal) to fragmented and 
wholly separate smaller units (ibid). More importantly, Kaufman explains that "the 
causes of system variance include not only power-balancing dynamics, which work only 
imperfectly, but also principles of unit identity [and] economic interdependence.. ." (ibid: 
~ o o ) . ~ '  AS a result, Kaufman calls for analyzing both submacro systems and economic 
interdependence within the international order. 
Submacro International Systems Theory 
One might imagine a whole range of international submacro systems affecting the 
world order. Kaplan suggests supranational groupings may make the international order 
bipolar, or otherwise politically divided (1957); Huntington suggests that the 
international order is divided by cultures (Huntington, 1996); regionalists have explored 
cooperation among neighboring states (Schirm, 2002); international political economists 
frequently investigate trade blocs. In each of these cases, submacro systems are defined 
(1) along political or military boundaries, (2) along social boundaries, (3 )  along 
40 Kaufman also calls for investigating technologies for governance and how they affect the international 
order. This topic encompassed the thrust of a class the author co-taught with several other GSSD affiliates 
in January, 2006. 
geographic boundaries, or (4) along explicitly-defined trade boundaries. This taxonomy 
of submacro systems explains all of the types of submacro systems which form, but no 
individual gradient of this taxonomy explains the participants of all submacro systems. 
For instance, if one seeks to capture submacro systems by only considering geographic 
boundaries, the cases of Cuba during the Cold War or Israel today show that such a 
methodology will have shortcomings (Berton, 1969: 333). If one only considers the 
cultural submacro systems in Inglehart and Carballo's displayed in the diagram in Figure 
4, one does not capture the economic-political submacro system of the EU or the divides 
of the Cold War. 
Figure 4: Where Given Societies Fall Along Two Cultural Dimensions. From Inglehart and Carballo, 
1997: pg. 41. 
Surprisingly, few scholars take a holistic perspective of these taxonomies into 
account, instead calling for the further examination within each of the gradients, not 
across the entire range of possibilities (Berton, 1969). After brilliantly discussing how 
the world order may experience a reversion to fragmented groupings, Kaufman himself 
falls into the regionalist camp, explaining that "rather than hegemony, the current system 
is more likely to devolve into regionalization as regional subsystems become increasingly 
autonomous from global forces" (1997: 201-202). Despite the fact that much of the IR 
domain compares specific types of submacro groupings, by not limiting ourselves to any 
specific taxonomy of submacro systems, we may be able to better capture the 
international system. We shall keep this in mind when we conduct our submacro 
analysis. 
Previous Empirical Research of lnterna tional Systems Theory: 
An Example 
Some nations are stronger than others, leading to hierarchies in the international 
system. As different alliance structures exist, some nations are more closely connected 
with one another. This homophily, or level of interconnections among groups of 
counties, varies across the international system.41 Moreover, the hierarchies of the macro 
system and the levels of homophily of the various subsystems vary over time. These 
systemic variations may have consequences for the likelihood of peace, leading to a host 
of questions. Does a system with a Balance of Power hierarchy tend to be peaceful 
compared to an imbalanced hierarchy? Are systems with bipolar hierarchies more 
peaceful than systems with multipolar hierarchies? Do systems with tight poles (with 
41 The terms "hierarchy" and "homophily" have been adopted from Dodds, Watts, and Sabel2003. De 
Mesquita and Lalman did not use them. 
high homophilies) tend to be more peaceful than systems with loose poles (with low 
homophilies)? 
Bruce Bueno De Mesquita and David Lalman seek to answer these questions in 
"Empirical Support for Systemic and Dyadic Explanations of International Conflict" 
(1 988). Using both systemic and dyadic statistical techniques, De Mesquita and 
Lalman's research suggests that systemic differences do not seem to affect international 
conflict. In contrast, individual country calculations of expected utilities of war are far 
better predictors for the breakout of international conflict. Before simply accepting that 
there is no relationship between system-types and international conflict however, we 
should formally scrutinize De Mesquita and Lalman's methodology. 
De Mesquita and Lalman's Methodological Strategy 
De Mesquita and Lalman examine whether systematic conditions are causes of 
higher levels of breakouts of international conflict between 1816 and 1965. The 
dependent variable is the breakouts of international conflict. The independent variables 
include various elements of macro structure of the international system (including 
bipolarity, multipolarity, Balance of Power, etc.), as well as a calculation of national 
incentives to go to war. 
In order to investigate the relationship between system and conflict, De Mesquita 
and Lalman conduct large-N empirical research, cleverly utilizing both systemic and 
dyadic strategies in their analysis. By considering the empirical problem in terms of both 
of these statistical approaches, De Mesquita and Lalman are also able to examine whether 
individual-country war calculating is a better gauge of conflict than a systemically- 
oriented variable. De Mesquita and Lalman recognize that a nation's interests may 
occasionally differ from the interests of the greater international community: the benefit 
of a split methodological approach is that they can test to see whether systemic variables 
affect international conflict, and then they can compare whether systemic variables are 
better determinants than individual country variables. 
De Mesquita and Lalman's Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable is defined clearly and concisely. The dependent variable 
in this project is outbreaks of conflict involving major powers. De Mesquita and Lalman 
utilize two datasets for identifying this outbreak of international conflict. The first 
dataset is provided by Singer and Small and each observation includes the onset of 
international conflict. As they are interested solely in outbreaks of war where major 
powers are involved, Singer and Small's dataset is ideal, as it also includes a 
classification for major powers. In the second dataset, De Mesquita and Lalman gather 
125 observations of international disputes. 97 of these disputes did not become wars, 
while 28 escalated to interstate wars, in accordance with the definition of war provided 
by Singer and Small. It is worth noting that we do not know how many of these 
international disputes involved major powers, a key component of the independent 
variable, but there is reason to suspect that there are not very many observations. De 
Mesquita and Lalman mention that for one of the three models presented which 
demonstrated that systemic influences have marginal effects on conflict, there were only 
six observations of major power war: a large problem for a model which had seven 
variables.42 
42 De Mesquita and Lalman 1988 : fn. 19 
De Mesquita and Lalman rely upon classifications of power and major power 
countries by Singer and Small, but they do not mention Singer and Small's definition of 
power, nor do they include examples of major powers beyond the United States following 
1939. Offering either of these pieces of information would have helped the reader 
understand major power war. Also, rather than including all major power countries, De 
Mesquita and Lalman constrict the major powers to countries in Europe, and include the 
United States following 1939. They justify doing so because it turns out that they are 
only concerned with international conflict involving Europe. Apparently, for De 
Mesquita and Lalman, the international system is really just a continental system. Of a 
more minor note, while Singer and Small analyze major powers fiom 1816-1 970, De 
Mesquita and Lalman drop the last four years (1966-1970) fiom their analysis for 
seemingly no good reason. 
De Mesquita and Lalman's Independent Variables 
When we turn to the independent variable, De Mesquita and Lalman's 
methodology is not robust. For starters, the authors do not define several key terms 
critical to the independent variables. The authors never explain what they mean by 
"international system." De Mesquita and Lalman implicitly consider system to include a 
range of both hierarchical and homophilic properties in terrns of three structural 
dimensions - Balanced-Preponderant, Bipolar-Multipolar, and Tight-Loose (in the 
context of the polar relationships) - but they do not explain why these are the only 
dimensions of the international system that they are considering. Furthermore, while De 
Mesquita and Lalman do consider the homophily of the polar relationships in terms of 
Tight and Loose, they do not consider the homophily of the entire macro system. From 
18 16- 1965, the levels of isolation versus interconnection in the macro system have 
undoubtedly fluctuated: economic globalization researchers have demonstrated that the 
level of macro homophily decreased following the Depression and increased following 
World War I1 (Hirst and Thompson, 2002). Not surprisingly, De Mesquita and Lalman 
do not control for fluctuations in macro level homophily. The challenges of 
operationalizing the components of the international system present a clear problem in 
their analysis. De Mesquita and Lalman acknowledge as much in their conclusion by 
passing the blame to systems theorists: "[wle hope that such theorists will help to inform 
future empirical investigations by specifying clearly and precisely what tests of their 
propositions are most appropriate" (1 988: 20). 
De Mesquita and Lalman juxtapose systemic-oriented independent variables with 
individual country incentives for war. To calculate these country incentives, the authors 
calculate the expected utility of war by using De Mesquita's equations for expected 
utility from "The War Trap Revisited: A Revised Expected-Utility Model" (1985). De 
Mesquita's paper updated his original expected utility equations to include the risk 
perspectives of a nation. Some nations are risk-takers, others are risk-neutral, while 
others are risk-averse, and each category has a different expected utility associated. De 
Mesquita and Lalman do not mention which category captures major powers, leaving us 
to guess which expected utility approximations they used. 
Improving De Mesquita and Lalman's Methodology for the Purposes 
of Identifying the Structure of the International System 
While De Mesquita and Lalman should be applauded for undertaking such an 
ambitious project, there are several ways in which their research methodology can be 
improved. First, an analysis of the international system needs to include the nations of 
the world, not just the nations of one continent. Second, an analysis of the international 
system needs to consider the fact that during certain times, we see different levels of 
isolationism across the entire system, meaning that the macro component of the 
international system itself may exhibit fluctuations in homophily. Third, the expected 
utility equations for a nation's desire to go to war are not explained in sufficient depth as 
variances in risk patterns are not explained.43 As we are not concerned with replicating 
De Mesquita and Lalman's project of comparing the effects of systems versus 
individuals, we shall not further concern ourselves with this part of De Mesquita and 
Lalman' s project. 
How can we address the other shortcomings? In National Power and the 
Structure of Foreign Trade, Hirschrnan argues that trade and trade relationships can serve 
as good indicators for international power (1980). By applying graph theory to 
international trade data, we can rectify the first shortcoming by identifying the positions 
of countries relative to one another in the international system of trade, a useful proxy for 
the international system at large." We can then use a large-N database of war such as the 
Correlates of War to measure international conflict beyond Europe and the great powers. 
Using graph theory, we can also measure levels of homophily, both at the macro 
level, and within subsystems and clusters of countries.45 We can measure the level of 
isolationism (versus interconnections) of the international system, adding another 
systemic dimension to De Mesquita and Lalman's analysis. 
43 Or even touched upon. 
44 As we shall explain later, one could identify major powers by selecting those countries with the highest 
numbers of degrees every year, where a degree is the number of major trade relationships a country enjoys. 
45 As we shall explain later, one could either use a clustering coefficient or the average degrees of 
separation as measures for homophily. 
Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, we have alluded to how we intend to capture and analyze the 
international system of trade. We plan to use graph theory to investigate the macro 
network and the submacro networks in the international trade system. Rather than 
assuming the memberships of the submacro groupings, however, we shall instead search 
for latent cliques of countries in the trade system and analyze those in the context of 
identifying an international hierarchy. 
In the next chapter, we shall implement techniques borrowed from graph theory in 
examining the macro structure of international trade relationships. What emerges is an 
alternative structure of the international order, with cliques and submacro systems 
playing a crucial role in the overall international system. We also present a basic set of 
terms and phrases common to graph theory, with clear explanations for the lay graph 
theorist. 
CHAPTER 3: MACRO PATTERNS IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 
Overview 
In the previous chapter, we discussed the international system of trade, suggesting 
that there are many possible macro level possibilities for the international system. In this 
chapter, we present the basic concepts of graph theory, in conjunction with our analysis 
of the macro level of the international trade system. To be specific, we shall empirically 
examine the macro system of world trade from 1962-2003. We find that the macro 
system most closely resembles a Scale-Free Network. This type of network suggests that 
other, non-dyadic relationships must be examined to best comprehend the hierarchy of 
the international trade system. 
Network Analysis of the Macro 
In the previous chapters, the reader has been exposed to several different ideas 
pertaining to the international system, including the international order and the various 
types of submacro systems as they relate to the international system. The usehlness of 
identifying such systems can help us understand how best to preserve equilibrium 
balances (Kaplan, 1957). In other words, identifying the structure and function of this 
international trade network should help us understand system stability and contagion 
effects. Contagion is defined by the World Bank as "the transmission of shocks to other 
countries or the cross-country correlation, beyond any fundamental link among the 
countries and beyond common shocks" (World Bank, 2006). The causes of these shocks 
46 Much of the computational work that is presented in this chapter was originally produced by Behram 
Mistree, a co-author of a forthcoming book chapter on this research. 
are variable and unique, but they have the effect of introducing instability to the 
international system, and therefore it is desirable to understand how contagion spreads. 
Understanding the structure and the evolution of the international trade network 
may have implications beyond understanding contagion as well. Considering economic 
globalization, there are two differing opinions about the way in which nations are 
becoming more inter~onnected.~~ Hirst and Thompson argue that the term 
"globalization" is a misnomer (2002). For them, what is really happening is increasing 
inter-nationalization, whereby separate and distinct national economies play the major 
role in the international system. On the other hand, Mansfield and Milner suggest that we 
are seeing a rise in regionalism, where nations band together to compete in the global 
economy (1 999). Understanding the nature of the international system and how it has 
changed over time can help us observe whether we are approaching an inter-regional 
system or whether we are destined to remain in the same-old inter-national system. 
Identifying these systems may also help us comprehend the nature of economic 
coercion and, as a result, the nature of power relationships between countries. Barnett 
and Duvall offer a value-neutral concept of power: "[plower is the production, in and 
through social relations, of effects that shape the capacities of actors to determine their 
circumstances and fate" (2005: 42).48 Power is not just an absolute: the overall wealth of 
a nation or its military strength are both usehl metrics of power to the extent that they 
can be compared to other nations. Therefore, the true power of a nation can only be 
47 Several works in international political economy simply seem to take the fact that international economic 
interconnection as an assumption, rather than empirically demonstrating it (Hirst and Thompson, 2002). 
We shall give these works evidence for their assumptions in Chapter 4. 
48 Barnett and Duvall are particularly concerned with avoiding definitions of power that force the scientist 
to automatically adopt the realist framework (2005). 
identified by considering that nation's placement in the international system relative to 
other nations. 
To understand the international system and power between nations, we need to 
identify the structures of the macro system. For better or worse, there are many to choose 
from, as we found in the last chapter. One may accept Walt's contention that "balancing 
is the dominant tendency in international politics" (1985: 39). But is the international 
order best described as one of a Balance of Power? Or is the order better conceptualized 
as Universal-Hegemonic? Maybe the international order has shifted from one type of 
structure to another over time? 
Such statements are queries relating to the system structure, and applying 
techniques of graph theory to international trade data may yield revealing findings. 
However, the reader must be familiar with at least a basic level of graph theory, so in this 
section, we will fully explain the terms and methods we are using. Just in case readers 
find themselves lost, or if the readers simply want a compendium of basic terms for 
future work, we have provided a Glossary at the end of this thesis. 
To begin, as we identified earlier, a graph, or a network, is simply a 
representation of a system.49 In our case, the network includes all countries and their 
relationships in a given time period. A node, also known as a vertex, represents an 
individual component of the system?' For our purposes, a node represents a country 
within the international system. Interactions among the nodes can be considered as the 
49 Most of the terms and descriptions have been identified and adapted from Newman, 2003, but they are all 
among the standard lexicon in network theory. Some of these terms are presented in this chapter, but are 
not used until later chapters. We group the terms together because it is helpfbl to make one repository of 
all the terms for ease of reading. 
50 Network theory is plagued by multiple labeling of similar concepts. In physics, a vertex is known as a 
site; in sociology a node is often referred to as an actor (Newman, 2003). 
unit of analysis. These interactions are usually expressed as an edge, which represents a 
relationship between two nodes.51 An edge may be directed or undirected. A directed 
edge represents a flow, while an undirected edge simply depicts the existence of a 
relationship between two nodes. A directed edge is usually displayed with an arrowhead 
showing the direction of the relationship; an undirected edge is simply a line connecting 
the two nodes.52 For examples from international politics, a directed edge could 
represent the flow of migrants from one country to another, while an undirected edge 
could represent the existence of diplomatic relations between two nations. In Figure 5, a 
network with its basic components is presented; note that the edges are ~ndirected.'~ 
Figure 5: A Labeled Network 
Graph theorists frequently discuss the number of degrees of a certain node. 
Degrees correspond to the number of relationships that a certain node enjoys. The 
5 '  Some individual edges can connect more than two nodes, but these are rare and are typically contained to 
very complex network theory. In physics, edges are also known as bonds; computer scientists call edges 
links; sociology labels these connections as ties. For an excellent summary of the concepts of graph theory 
that both a novice graph theorist and a network veteran would appreciate, read Newman's "The Structure 
and Function of Complex Networks" (2003). 
52 Any existing relationship between two nodes is either directed or undirected. 
53 Directed edges are oftentimes known as arcs, and they are represented as arrows (rather than lines) to 
show directionality. 
number of degrees can be counted by counting the number of edges of a node. In Figure 
6, Nodes A, C, and E all have only one degree (A-F, C-B, and E-D, respectively). Node 
B has two degrees (B-C and B-F), Node D has two degrees (D-E and D-F), and Node F 
has three degrees (F-A, F-B, and F-D). Sometimes one node may be included in the 
system, but may not connect to the larger grouping. Node G is one such example, with 
zero degrees. In practice, one would be hard-pressed to identify a country entirely 
isolated from the rest of the modem-day network, but it is nevertheless theoretically 
possible. 
Figure 6: A Network with Nodes A-G 
The degree ofseparation is the minimum number of edges between two nodes.54 
In Figure 6, the degree of separation from A to E is three (A-F, F-D, and D-E)? In the 
international system, imagine the United States and Cuba, which for all intents and 
purposes do not trade directly with each other. However, both the US and Cuba trade 
with Mexico, meaning that the US and Cuba are only separated by two degrees. Each 
node also has an average degree of separation. The average degree of separation 
represents the mean distance from a given node to the other nodes in the network. 
54 The degree of separation is also known as a geodesic path. 
55 The concept of degrees of separation has been popularized by the theory of six degrees of separation, 
whereby any two randomly selected individuals are suspected to be connected by six or fewer acquaintance 
relationships. Duncan Watts has written Six Degrees: The Science of a Connected Age which considers the 
history and the future of network theory in understanding social systems (2003). 
Excluding G from Figure 6, the average degree of separation for Node A is 1115, while 
the average degree of separation for Node F is 715. Notice that Node A is less central to 
the network than Node F. The average degree of separation reflects this centrality. 
While nodes have average degrees of separation, a network also has an average 
degree of separation. The average degree of separation for an undirected network is 
simply the mean of the average degrees of separation for all nodes contained in the 
network. In Figure 6, if one once again excludes G, the average degree of separation in 
the network is 62125.'~ 
Finally, we have the clustering c ~ e f l c i e n t . ~ ~  The clustering coefficient for a node 
is the likelihood that its partner nodes interact with one another. In terms of trade, 
imagine three countries: A, B, and C. If Countries A and B trade, and Countries B and C 
trade, the clustering coefficient shows the likelihood of a trade relationship existing 
between Countries A and C. In Figure 7, the clustering coefficient of A in the top-left 
quadrant is one (B, C, and D all trade with each other); the clustering coefficient of A in 
the top-right quadrant is zero; in the bottom-left A is again zero; and in the bottom-right, 
A's clustering coefficient is 213. The clustering coefficient may also be averaged over 
the entire network. In the top-left network in Figure 7, the average clustering coefficient 
of the network is one; in the top-right and the bottom-left quadrants, the average 
clustering coefficients of the networks are both zero; and in the bottom-right quadrant, 
the average clustering coefficient of the network is 111 2. 
56 The average degree of separation for A= 1115; B= 915; C= 1315; D= 915; E= 1315; F= 715. Combining the 
average degrees of separation, we have 6215, which then needs to be divided by 5 ,  as there are five nodes in 
the network. This gives us an average degree of separation in the network of 62125. 
57 Clustering is also known as transitivity. 
Figure 7: Four Different Networks 
The clustering coefficient is usehl for explaining the insularity of various 
networks, but it can also show when a country serves as a connector between other 
nations. Consider Node A in the top right-hand quadrant versus Node A in the top left- 
hand quadrant in Figure 7. In the top right-hand quadrant, Node A has monopolized the 
relationships, meaning that B, C, and D are all dependent upon A. On the left, nodes are 
connected directly, and therefore if they are trading, they may go through their own 
channels rather than having to go through A. 
Albert Hirschman convincingly argues that countries strive to be Node A in the 
top right-hand quadrant (1980). Keohane observes that "Hirschrnan defined the 
'influence effect of foreign trade7 as resulting from dependence of one nation on another 
and argued that 'the classical concept, gain from trade, and the power concept, 
dependence on trade, are seen merely as two aspects of the same phenomenon" 
(Keohane, 1997: 158). Dependencies caused by trade are sources of power: Nodes B, C, 
and D, all depend upon Node A for trade, making Node A relatively powerful. 
Three Possible Network Structures 
In Chapter 2, we discussed several possibilities of the international order (also 
known as the macro system) derived from the IR literature, and one can imagine a list of 
possibilities even beyond those presented. In graph theory, there is a corresponding set of 
possibilities, each of which may capture the structure of the macro system in the context 
of the international system? There are at least three broad categories of network types, 
with a whole range of network types in between. The first category is the Egalitarian 
Network. In an Egalitarian Network, all nodes are equal in terms of their relationships 
with one another. All nodes have the same number of degrees and no form of hierarchy 
exists between the nodes. An Egalitarian Network in the context of the macro trade 
system would occur if all countries were equal in terms of both the number of bilateral 
trade relationships they enjoyed and the size of the bilateral trade relationships. In Figure 
8, such a network is displayed. Notice how each node is equally connected. 
58  Actually these are the two most commonly-discussed types of networks in network theory; other 
networks are simply derivations of these networks. 
Figure 8: An Egalitarian Network Structure 
Another type of network frequently discussed in the graph theory literature is the 
Random Network (Newman, 2003; Barabiisi and Albert, 1999). A Random Network is 
one in which the degree distribution is Gaussian, or evenly distributed. In a Random 
Network, a hierarchy could exist with certain nodes playing more important roles than 
others, but the bulk of the nodes have a similar set of degrees. Hence, Random Networks 
have interactions taking place across a global arena: there are few submacro groupings, if 
any. Figure 9(a) presents such a network structure. 
(a) Random network (b) Scale-free network 
Figure 9: A Random Network (a) versus a Scale-Free Network (b), from wikipediaSg 
59 We realize that using Wikipedia should be done with caution, but they present one of the clearest images 
of a random versus a scale-fiee network. The image is located in Scale-Free Networks at 
http://wiki~edia.org;/ (Accessed 2006). 
In contrast, a Scale-Free Network is one in which the degree distribution follows a 
Power-Law, where most nodes have few degrees while just a few nodes have high 
numbers of degrees. A Scale-Free Network tends to be dominated by submacro 
interactions. It must also have a hierarchical structure as certain nodes are more central 
to the network than others. These types of networks have recently received special 
attention by theorists as "citation networks, the World Wide Web, the Internet, metabolic 
networks, telephone call graphs and the network of human sexual contacts" all appear to 
be scale-free networks (Newman, 2003: 188). Figure 9(b) presents a Scale-Free 
Network. Notice the colored nodes, which indicate nodes that are more central to the 
system structure than the peripheral nodes surrounding them!' All networks that have 
hierarchies involve such Hubs and Spokes, where certain nodes are central to the system 
structure (Hubs), while others are at the fringes of the system structure, both literally and 
figuratively (Spokes). 
Macro Level Methodology 
To test which type of network best represents the macro system, we gathered 
export data from 1962-2003 from the UN Comtrade c at abase.^' We selected trade data 
for this experiment for three reasons. First, trade relationships are easy to measure.62 
Data is easily accessible, and unlike war or conflict, trade relationships are generally 
60 Discussions of core- and peripheral- countries are common in IR literature (Wallerstein, 1976; 
Denemark, et al., 2000). However, such terms have developed a pejorative connotation as they are 
frequently associated with colonization and imperialism. In order to jump this semantic hurdle, we shall 
utilize their graph theoretic terms: Hubs and Spokes. 
Behram Mistree extracted the data from the database by constructing a computer program that interfaced 
with the United Nation's website using standard http protocols. The program requested, parsed, and stored 
information from the site. 
62 We are analyzing relationships over time, but we want measures that are time-appropriate. Imagine 
receiving a measure that Country A received six million dollars in capital from Country B in a given year. 
Due to the tremendous fluidity of capital, this number might become inflated as over the course of the year, 
some of the capital given to Country A is returned to Country B, only to be again returned to Country A. 
Therefore, measuring relationships in terms of capital flows does not work. 
agreed upon. Second, trade is one of the most important relationships in IR: all countries 
engage in some level of international trade. At the same time, with economic 
globalization, the World Trade Organization, and the unification of currencies in Europe, 
patterns of trade have undergone profound changes over the last forty years. 
Understanding how these changes have affected the international system is worthwhile. 
Third, trade is a strong proximate indicator for power relationships between countries and 
power relationships are the fundamental building blocks of the international system at 
large (Hirschrnan, 1980). In other words, we may be analyzing the international system 
of trade, but such analysis helps us better understand the international economic system, 
as well as the international system in general. 
In our analysis of the macro system, all relationships are undirected. This means 
that we are studying interactions not in terms of flows between countries, but instead we 
are looking at the aggregate numbers and sizes of the interactions themselves. The 
database itself provides dollar value relationships between all countries. The level of 
detail of the UN Comtrade data is actually quite impressive. For instance, Comtrade lists 
that Egypt exported $575 worth of goods to Bermuda in 2003. However, Egypt's exports 
to Bermuda account for a negligible fraction of its overall exports. Afraid that the 
inclusion of such superfluous relationships may obfuscate the fundamental dynamics we 
are attempting to uncover, we only include "major" export flows. 
For the purposes of this paper, we define "major" in such a way that an export 
flow will only be included when Country A receives a quantity of exports from Country 
B that is in the top 70% of total exports for Country B . ~ ~  In as much as quantitative 
63 We believe that using 70% as the cutoff adequately strikes a balance between reducing the relatively 
minor data that would shroud the depiction of the macro network while preserving the general and major 
55 
analysis is an art, we recognize that such a cutoff introduces a level of subjectivity, but 
this subjectivity is minimal. More important, this cutoff is rendered consistently 
throughout the analysis. For more about the data-organizing methodology, please see 
Appendix A. 
To discern results, we shall use two tools: visualization and statistical analysis. 
Visualizations are one of the key aspects of graph theory. Newman explains that "[tlhe 
human eye is an analytic tool of remarkable power, and eyeballing pictures of networks is 
an excellent way to gain an understanding of their structure" (Newman, 2003: 170-1 7 1). 
Beyond graph theory, Ortiz discusses the potentials of visualization as a methodology in 
political science, as visualizations may reveal patterns and relationships which would 
have gone undetected using traditional analysis (2005). When implementing 
visualizations as a methodology, however, the researcher must be wary. McGrath and 
Blythe discuss the dangers of visualizations as methodologies as visualizations may 
appear different to different people, conveying different meanings and relationships to 
different researchers (2004). Therefore, we will complement our analysis by 
investigating degrees of separation and clustering coefficients in an empirically-oriented 
manner. Fortunately, graph theory has recently begun to adapt to such empirical 
techniques as complex networks with millions and billions of relationships are now 
common in other areas of study (particularly biology) and simply visualizing these 
networks with millions and billions of interconnections is relatively ineffectual 
(Newman, 2003). As a result, statistics are also being introduced to graph theory to better 
explain how components in complex systems affect one another. 
international trade trends. In the future, we shall conduct sensitivity analysis to see how greatly our results 
change with various cutoff rates. 
To return to the methodology for visualization, there are several different ways of 
portraying networks. After reviewing several of these different ways, we decided to 
employ a spring embeddingfunction when our graphs get too complicated, a special type 
of energy minimization technique.64 An energy minimization function plots the nodes 
with higher degrees in the center of the image as the algorithm tries to minimize the 
distance of each edge while allowing a minimum set space between each node. As a 
result, Hub countries are centered in the image, while outer Spoke countries are placed at 
the h n g e  of the image. 
In Figures 10 and 11, export relationships among the nations of the world are 
presented for 1965. Throughout this thesis, we have chosen to show one network image 
without labels and one with labels so that the reader can first get a general feel for the 
system structure without being impeded by the country labels, and in the following graph 
the reader can then identify the locations of the countries themselves. The reader should 
notice the large number of degrees shared between the nodes in the center of the network 
relative to the rest of the network. Not surprisingly, these countries are among the 
world's richest: the United Kingdom, the United States, and West Germany are the three 
countries with the most degrees in 1965. 
In Figures 12 and 13, the state of the macro trade network in 2000 is presented. 
Again, in the first graph, we do not include country labels so that the reader can visually 
inspect the network. Looking at Figure 12 versus Figure 10, the central part of the graph 
64 These figures were drawn using Netdraw with 100 iterations of the spring embedding function with 
distance between components equaling 5.  Due to the nature of these graphing programs, images are never 
completely replicable, although the significant relationships should still stand out. After experimenting 
with another widely-available program known as Pajek, we found Netdraw to be more user-friendly. 
contains more nodes. Furthermore, those central countries are increasingly linked with 
one another. 
Before drawing any more conclusions about the changes between 1965 and 2000, 
two caveats are worth noting. First, since the Comtrade data only offers data for selected 
countries (typically only for countries that are members of the UN), some countries are 
not captured in these images, particularly the countries that are not somehow attached to 
the main network. Second, more countries are included in the dataset in 2000 than in 
1965. There could be two reasons for such a condition: more countries may have joined 
the UN database and/or more countries have entered the macro trade system. Despite 
these caveats, we can observe that the overall structure of the network has remained the 
same, with the center countries maintaining their importance to the overall network 
stability (if not assuming more importance). The center region has also become denser as 
the Hub countries seem to be trading more with one another and there appears to be more 
Hubs in 2000. 
(This area has intentionally been left blank.) 
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These images alone do not confirm the existence of a Scale-Free Network, but 
they do show variations among countries that may suggest differences in trade-power as 
expressed by their macro positioning.65 Notice that the countries in the center - countries 
like the United Kingdom and the United States - are the ones which most trade 
relationships are dependent upon. Notice how the outer countries tend to have few 
relationships with other countries and are typically dependent upon only one or two 
countries. Notice how China moves from an outer ring of trade in 1965 to the inner 
echelons of the network in 2000. In contrast, notice how Afghanistan's position in the 
international trade system declines as it moves from a semi-Hub location even more 
central than China to a remote comer of the graph by 2000. 
In order to determine whether the trade system conforms to a Scale-Free Network, 
we must inspect the distribution of degrees. In Figures 14 and 15, we display the 
distribution of degrees in 1965 and 2000, respectively? The x-axis represents the 
number of degrees of a nation and the y-axis represents the probability of a given country 
having that number of degrees. So in 2000, 2 out of 161 countries had forty degrees 
exactly. Therefore, there is a 211 61 chance that if a country were selected at random, it 
would have forty degrees. If we were to observe a Dirac distribution (whereby all 
countries would have the same number of degrees), an Egalitarian Network would be in 
effect; if we were to observe a Gaussian distribution, a Random Network would be in 
effect; if we were to observe a Power-Law distribution, a Scale-Free Network would be 
in place, with a definite hierarchy among nodes. We find that in both 1965 and 2000, the 
65 Power is used here in terms of Hirschrnan's conception of power. 
66 These charts were generated using Matlab. We also used Stata and Microsoft Excel for statistical work. 
power-law distribution confirms that the macro trade system conforms to a Scale-Free 
Network. 
Power Law Degree Distn bution: 1965 
0.45 I I 1 I r I t 
For log vs. log plot 
r =-0.84094 
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Figure 14: Distribution of Degrees in 1965 
Power Law Degree Distri bution:2000 
For log vs. log plot: 
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Figure 15: Distribution of Degrees in 2000 
A Scale-Free Network suggests that the overall system is dependent upon some 
sort of hierarchy. There are several possible hierarchies outlined in the graph theory 
literature. Beyond Hubs and Spokes, Dodds, Watts, and Sabel have categorized five such 
possibilities for hierarchical network structures: Random, Random Interdivisional, Core- 
Periphery, Local Team, and Multiscalar (2004)~~ The first two hierarchies are restricted 
to Random Networks. In a Random Hierarchy, links are distributed across a system so 
that flows and relationships need not necessarily follow a top-down structure. In a 
Random Interdivisional Hierarchy, there are apparent top-down relationships, but 
interactions take place across these cliques in a macro manner more so than a submacro 
manner. The second two hierarchies occur within Scale-Free Networks. In a Core- 
Periphery Hierarchy, links occur exclusively within clear-cut cliques in a very rigid and 
top-down structure. In such a hierarchy, a subservient node may only interact with the 
node above it. In a Local Team Hierarchy, the distributions are further mottled, as nodes 
of the same team can interact with one another, but must interact with a Hub node. 
Between the Random Network (typified solely by global interactions) and the Scale-Free 
Network (typified solely by clique interactions) lies the Multiscalar ~ i e r a r c h ~ . "  In the 
Multiscalar Hierarchy, both global and clique interactions are equally implicit to the 
network structure. In a Multiscalar Hierarchy, link density (the frequency of links) 
decreases monotonically with depth. In the top grouping, such hierarchies share a 
67 Since Pool's days, MIT's Department of Political Science has played a relatively small role in social 
network analysis, but former department members are playing active roles in the domain nonetheless. For 
example, Charles Sabel was a professor at MIT from 1977-1995; according to his publications, however, he 
did not become involved in graph theory until joining the faculty at Columbia University. This lack of 
researchers within our department is particularly surprising given the fact that graph theory has emerged in 
departments across the Institute, and that the Department of Political Science has a strong history of multi- 
disciplinary collaboration. 
68 The term "Scale-Free" refers to the fact that there are no scales in the degree distribution; there may be 
scales in other elements of a Scale-Free Network, however (Newrnan, 2003), giving rise to the possibility 
of a Mulitscalar hierarchy. 
multitude of relationships with one another, with nodes involved in both horizontal and 
vertical relationships, but by the bottom grouping, relationships are almost entirely 
vertical. In Figure 16, several possible hierarchies are displayed, courtesy of Dodds, et 
al. In the image, the darker area implies thicker link density, or homophily, between the 
component nodes. 
Figure 16: Possible Hierarchical Structures. Courtesy of Dodds, et al., 2004 
In each of these last three hierarchies, the key players - the Hubs - are critical 
within their own clique of countries (their own submacro systems), but they can also 
render huge effects upon the overall international order. But how well do these structures 
map onto traditional IR theory? The most striking similarity rests in terns of the Core- 
Periphery distinction. As we mentioned earlier, in the literature, one often encounters 
discussions of core and peripheral countries (Wallerstein, 1976; Denemark, et al., 2000). 
Core countries are countries which effectively run and determine the international system 
due to their economic and military strength, while peripheral countries are dependent 
upon other actors and play a distanced role in the world system (ibid). However in our IR 
literature, the existence of core and periphery countries could - and frequently should - 
take on the structure of these hierarchies and therefore the core-periphery distinction is 
more similar to Hubs versus Spokes. So as not to confuse the reader, we shall continue to 
label what is usually described as core countries as Hub countries, while we shall classify 
peripheral countries as Spokes. 
Scale-Free Networks contain important subsystem groupings that have profound 
implications for the overall network structure and stability. A Scale-Free Network has 
several subsystem groupings and it is the structure and function of these submacro system 
groupings that have huge ramifications for the international system. If the subsystems are 
becoming separated and more distinct, as we would expect if regionalism or some other 
submacro form were on the rise (as Mansfield and Milner, 1999 suggests), we would 
observe cliques in which the distributions of relationships and the distribution of power 
increasingly centered on the Hub of the clique. Alternatively, if we were observing the 
increasing cohesiveness of nations relative to each other and the emergence of a flat 
world, as Thomas Friedman suggests (2005), we would expect to see a transition to a 
Random Network where cliques and inter-national economies do not matter as much.69 
69 Hirst and Thompson discuss the difference between globalization and inter-nationalization, explaining 
that globalization occurs when a single unified global market is more prevalent than any national markets. 
Hirst and Thompson explain that the international system is actually one in which inter-national markets 
dominate the international arena (2002). 
However, we clearly cannot understand the international system or its macro system 
without understanding the submacro system.70 
Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, we have offered a primer of the basic concepts of graph theory by 
analyzing international trade in the macro system. We find that rather than resembling an 
Egalitarian Network or a Random Network, patterns of international trade most closely 
resemble a Scale-Free Network, with localized relationships playing a significant role in 
the international trade system. Hub countries exert tremendous influence in their own 
cliques, and can exercise limited influence among the clique of Hubs that, for all intents 
and purposes, runs the macro system. Furthermore, this structure of a macro system has 
been in place for at least 35 years, and according to the macro system analysis, it should 
continue to be the case. However, submacro analysis will better help us understand how 
the macro system is changing, as we shall see in the upcoming chapters. Submacro 
analysis will also help us further understand the hierarchy of the system. 
Graph theory is useful for understanding a system's overall structure, but it is also 
useful for understanding relative positions of elements within a system. Therefore in the 
following chapters, we aim to hrther understand the relative positions of nations within 
the international system by identifying the submacro components of the international 
trade system and the hierarchies inherent to the system, but we also aim to identify where 
countries lie in terms of their submacro systems and the macro system as a whole. 
70 The existence of submacro clusters may confirm Huntington's position that sub-international groupings 
of countries are the best way of conceiving of the macro system (Huntington, 1996). Alternatively, the 
existence of clusters in the international system may confirm those who believe the macro system is 
actually just a set of several regional systems, with the regions primarily dictated by geography (Schirm, 
2002). Certainly, there are formal regional structures which countries join, forming explicit clusters. 
However, in order to determine the true conditions of the system and whether Huntington and the 
Regionalists are correct, we must identify the latent subsystems. 
CHAPTER 4: SUBMACRO PATTERNS IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 
Overview 
In Chapter 2, we reviewed a host of literature which suggested that we need to 
understand the substructures of the international system in order to understand the 
international system as a whole. In Chapter 3, we empirically demonstrated the 
importance of such submacro systems in the context of the international order as we 
found the presence of a Scale-Free Network. In this chapter, we design and implement a 
graph theory-derived methodology for inspecting these international submacro systems in 
order to determine which sort of system hierarchy best describes the structure of 
international trade. In this chapter and in Chapter 5,  we find that a Multiscalar Hierarchy 
best captures the international system of trade. 
Formulating a Rigorous Submacro Approach 
In order to construct the international system, we need an approach that will help 
us identify latent cliques in the international community. From these latent cliques, we 
hope to be able to identify the hierarchy that best captures the international system. Once 
we recognize the hierarchy, we can discuss economic stability, contagion, the utility (or 
futility) of economic sanctions, integration, and neo-functionalism with a better 
understanding of the true state of the international system. 
As we mentioned in Chapters 1 and 2, much research has been restricted to 
analyzing parallel submacro systems that belong to similar taxonomies (such as culture, 
formalized trade, etc.), while few approaches, if any, explore parallels between these 
taxonomies. In other words, when investigating submacro conditions, researchers tend to 
make implicit assumptions about the inter-country group they are examining. In order to 
avoid introducing our own biases into the study, we need to crafi a way in which to 
transcend these taxonomies and capture the true formation of international interactions at 
the submacro level, especially across time. 
Techniques of graph theory once again offer us a solution. Scholars in graph 
theory have increasingly focused on uncovering latent clique structures within complex 
networks (Newman, 2004). There are several algorithms that have emerged for 
identifying these cliques.71 Among them are spectral-bisection, the Kernighan-Lin 
Algorithm (both championed by computer scientists), and the Bron-Kerbosch Algorithm 
(especially useful for finding and defining sociological cliques) (Newman, 2004). In 
each of these algorithms, the number of latent cliques must be predetermined, and each 
component must belong to one - and only one - of the cliques. The Giwan-Newman 
Algorithm represents an improvement as it finds "natural" grouping among the 
components, whereby the user does not have to define how many cliques actually exist at 
the outset (Newman, 2004). 
For studying the international trade system, there are many drawbacks to even the 
Giwan-Newman Algorithm. Firstly, by requiring all countries to be classified in a clique, 
inaccurate groupings of loosely-related nations will be endemic in our analysis. 
Secondly, our grouping algorithm should reflect the conditions of the submacro system 
that we have already identified. Most importantly, an algorithm which recognizes that a 
country may belong to more than one clique would be tremendously advantageous. 
Consider the United States, for example, which is heavily involved in trade across the 
71 Rather than engage in a lengthy discourse about the mathematics behind each of these algorithms, we 
shall contain our discussion to the pros and the cons of each algorithm only with regard to our purposes. 
We recognize that the Palla, et al. algorithm which we end up utilizing is the best for our purposes and not 
necessarily best for other purposes. For a brief introduction to community analysis, consult Newrnan, 2003 
and Newrnan, 2004. 
world. If we were to use the Giwan-Newman Algorithm, the United States could only be 
included in one submacro system. However, the United States plays an important role in 
several submacro systems, interacting in otherwise secluded trading communities in 
Africa, as well as trading communities in South America, for example. 
Palla, Derknyi, Farkas, and Vicsek offer a solution in the form of an algorithm 
which recognizes that components in a network may belong to several different 
communities (2005) .~~  Such an algorithm offers us a way of identifying latent submacro 
systems without limiting the participation of a country to a singular submacro system.73 
In Figure 17, fi-om Palla, et al., the image on the left shows how typical community 
identification analysis does not recognize overlaps. Such an image is the product of a 
divisive grouping algorithm, like the four previously identified. The image on the right 
shows overlapping cliques, with nodes that belong to more than one clique, as produced 
by Palla, et al. Considering the manifest divides in the international system alone, such a 
structure may be more appropriate: France belongs to NATO and the EU while the 
United States is a member of both NAFTA and the OECD. The Palla, et al. Algorithm 
offers us the best leverage for considering the submacro systems of the international trade 
system. 
72 Palla, et al., are all biologists. It is comforting to note that other methodological techniques employed in 
IR and biology are also shared. McClelland's concept of equilibrium comes from biology (identified by 
Goodman, 1965). More recently, evolutionary biologists have adopted methodologies in game theory for 
their purposes (Hauert and Doebeli, 2004). 
73 The algorithm was originally constructed to observe protein cliques in yeast to make predictions for the 
unknown functions of some proteins (Derenyi, et al., 2005). 
Figure 17: Divisive Cliques vs. Overlapping Cliques 
Recognizing that there are overlaps among latent trading communities, the Palla, 
et al. Algorithm allows us to entirely reconsider the submacro concept. Such community 
identification analysis should not be confused with typical clustering analysis found in 
traditional statistics. When one uses methods of clustering analysis found in traditional 
statistics, one is grouping observations based upon similar  characteristic^.^^ Such 
clustering analysis would be useful for creating a cluster of the richest countries in the 
world, for example. In contrast, community identification analysis groups countries 
based upon their relationships with one another rather than basing the groupings upon 
their similar attributes. In order not to further confuse the reader, we shall not use the 
term "cluster" to describe our submacro groupings, but instead we shall call them either 
cliques or communities, both acceptable substitutes in the graph theory literature 
(Newman, 2004; Palla, et al., 2005). 
" Newman observes that the algorithms used for clustering analysis and community identification analysis 
can be adapted for one another with some effort (2003). 
The Palla, et al. Algorithm is based upon an adaptation of an existing method for 
identifying latent cliques.75 The existing method is known as the Clique Percolation 
Method (CPM). The CPM identifies cliques by scanning for k-cliques. A k-clique is one 
in which all nodes within the clique share a specified minimum number of edges minus 
one. More formally, k-cliques are "complete (fully connected) subgraphs of k vertices" 
(Derknyi, Palla, and Vicsek, 2005: 160202-2). In Figure 18, a k-clique is presented 
where k=2. Because it is the minimum number of edges, notice that despite the fact that 
two of the nodes in this figure actually have four edges, the rest of the nodes have three 
edges, making k2. Essentially, a CPM algorithm scans the data for each of these k- 
cliques starting at k=3, then proceeding to k4, and so on. As a result, any clique 
requires at least 3 nodes. As the algorithm reaches the maximum k-clique, the 
percolation method instructs the algorithm to terminate. 
Figure 18: A k-Clique Where k=2 
Ordinarily, once a typical algorithm identifies a node at one k-clique level, it does 
not group that node with any other clique at that level. The Palla, et al. Algorithm does 
75 For those further interested in the mathematics behind the algorithms, first consult the Derknyi, et al. 
article in Physical Review Letters, 2005, before Palla, et al., 2005, in Nature. 
the opposite. Nodes are included across several cliques, even at a common k-clique level 
(Derknyi, et al., 2005; Palla, et al., 2005). 
Palla, et al. have graciously made their clique-identifjmg algorithm publicly 
available and free of charge, even providing a graphical user interface for convenience 
(2005) .~~ The program which they create, known as CFinder, visually displays the latent 
cliques. 
To locate and identify the submacro structures, we again use export data from the 
UN Comtrade Database fiom 1962-2003.~~ From this data we again identify dyadic 
relationships between countries, again only including major trade relationships.78 Once 
the data is organized in terms of dyads, stored in a text file, and selected, CFinder runs 
the calculations and computes the latent clusters. 
CFinder not only identifies relationships and shows latent clusters, but also graphs 
the clusters. However, CFinder does not incorporate spring embedding or any energy 
minimization function into its graphs, making some of the visualizations very difficult to 
analyze. We therefore will use another visualization program (known as Netdraw) to 
visually depict some of the more complex submacro systems, utilizing spring embedding 
functions and energy minimizations, which we discussed in Chapter 3. 
76 For Palla, et al.'s algorithm and clustering program, visit htt~://an~el.elte.hu/clustering/ (Accessed April, 
2006). 
77 For a more rigorous discussion about the methods of data collection, please see Chapter 2 and Appendix 
A. Again, Behram Mistree did the initial data work by gathering the data from UN Comtrade. His help 
and guidance throughout the project has been greatly appreciated. Hanyin Lin's assistance in organizing 
the data and polishing the graphs is much appreciated. 
78 Major trade relationships are already defmed and explained in Chapter 2. 
Findings 
Palla, et al.'s CFinder program returns ten to twenty latent submacro systems for 
each year of analysis.79 Recall that a latent submacro system is one in which the 
relationships need not be formalized or established beforehand. The findings in and of 
themselves show many temporal patterns and international developments, but we are 
interested in extracting intertemporal patterns that can help us understand the overall 
international trade system. For this reason, we only present selected latent submacro 
systems and we contain our analysis to three years: 1962, 1982, and 2002. 
Latent Submacro Systems in 1962 
1962 was an exciting year for scholars of international politics. Colonialism was 
in a downturn, as France ceded independence to Algeria, and the United Kingdom was 
unable to halt the new constitution in Southern Rhodesia (now known as Zimbabwe), 
while also losing Jamaica. Malaysia would become independent fiom the United 
Kingdom the next year. Also in 1962, the Cuban Missile Crisis would grip the 
international community. 
In terms of trade, several major events took place. Cuba and the Soviet Union 
formally signed a trade pact on January 9, provoking the United States to begin a trade 
embargo on Cuba three weeks later. The 1962 United States Trade Expansion Act 
authorized the United States government to negotiate tariff cuts of up to 50%, a move 
largely celebrated by those involved in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT).*' The European Economic Community (EEC), the precursor of the EU, was a 
79 A latent clique, a latent cluster, a latent community, a latent grouping, and a latent submacro system are 
all equivalent. We avoid "cluster" because we do not want to confuse the reader with clustering analysis 
typical in traditional statistics. 
*' The historical information presented comes from a shining beacon of graph theory: the World Wide 
Web, and more specifically, fiom Wikipedia. One should always confirm facts found on Wikipedia, 
fledgling organization, in its fourth year of its existence. The Central American Common 
Market (CACM) had been formed the year before between El Salvador, Guatemala, and 
Honduras; in 1962 the CACM would accept Nicaragua. 
CFinder identifies twelve cliques in 1962: one k=9 clique, one k=8 clique, two 
k=7 cliques, two k=6 cliques, two k=5 cliques, one k=4 clique, and three k=3 cliques.81 
As is the case across all of the years, among the largest cliques is a Western I Euro- 
centric clique that includes the United States. In Figure 19, we present this grouping of 
traders.82 
Figure 19: A k=9 Latent Clique from 1962, with Country Labels 
however, and we have done so using other websites not linked through Wikipedia. Plus, most of the 
historical facts are common knowledge. 
CFinder9s algorithm is consistent and efficient, showing the same number of cliques on repeated 
iterations of the algorithm, while taking a short amount of time to compute. 
82 Following our pattern established earlier, when the image of the network may not be apparent with 
country labels, we first present the image of the network, and then the image of the network with country 
labels. We do so in order to best visualize the structure of the system and to best visualize the locations of 
components of the system. 
Of the nine countries included in this clique, four of them - France, Belgium- 
Luxembourg, West Germany, the Netherlands, and Italy - were all founding members of 
the EU, and they were the EU's only members in 1 9 6 2 . ~ ~  Of the countries in the clique, 
all except the United States and Switzerland would eventually join the EU. In Chapter 3, 
we discussed the concept of the clustering coeficient. Recalling the example, if 
Countries A and B trade, and Countries B and C trade, the clustering coefficient shows 
the likelihood of a trade relationship existing between Countries A and C. Each node has 
a clustering coefficient, which represents the likelihood that its trading partners also trade 
with one another. In 1962, the average clustering coefficient of the 86 countries included 
in the database was 0.6363. In contrast, the nine countries in the k=9 latent clique had an 
average clustering coefficient of 0.3466. 
To understand why this number is so low, consider the United States, Venezuela, 
and Afghanistan in 1962. Both Venezuela and Afghanistan exported to the United States, 
but they did not trade with each other, and therefore this lowered the United States' 
clustering coefficient. Countries with low clustering coefficients tend to serve as 
connectors across the several Spokes in the system. In 1962, the five countries with the 
lowest clustering coefficients were France (0.1220), the United States (0.1396), the 
United Kingdom (0.1 5 82), the Soviet Union (0.1 62 I), and China (0.2000). Interestingly, 
countries at the higher end of the spectrum are not necessarily economically deprived, but 
they are not as critical to the international trade system. Heavily dependent upon their 
83 According to the UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics, the EU actually included five countries: France, 
Italy, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg (2005). However, Corntrade data only recognizes the 
country of Belgium-Luxembourg in 1962. 
local partners, Norway (0.9524) and Denmark (0.9286) are among the countries with the 
highest clustering  coefficient^.^^ 
It is also sometimes helpful to visualize the actual amount of trade taking place 
between nations in a submacro system. In Figure 20, we display the trade relationships 
of the same k=9 clique, only in this case, the edges are thickened according to the natural 
logarithm of the dollar amount of the trade relationship along a pre-determined gradient. 
We do not see one country where all trade must flow through. Notice that among this 
clique, countries are for the most part equals.85 They are mutually reliant upon one 
another, but they are all also strong enough to rely on other parts of the international 
system. 
m- 
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Figure 20: A k=9 Latent Clique from 1962, with Weighted Relationships and Country Labels 
84 Norway and Denmark have the highest clustering coefficients of all countries that had clustering 
coefficients below 1.000. Typically the countries that have a perfect clustering coefficient are less 
developed, although Norway scores a 1.000 in 1963, proving that there are exceptions to the rule. 
With Spain appearing to be a somewhat more marginal player in the community. 
Figures 21 and 22 display images of two different latent cliques at the k-6 level. 
The first clique involves several Asian-Oceanic nations. The second clique shows trade 
relationships among a primarily European clique. In Figures 23 and 24, we combine the 
two cliques to show their interconnections, using the spring embedding function in 
~e tdraw? Again, the first figure simply displays the pattern; the following figure gives 
the country labels as well. These figures are very hard to interpret, so in Figures 25 and 
26, the graph has been manipulated to highlight the role of intermediaries between the 
cliques. Figure 26 is weighted so that the reader may see the strength of relationships 
with intermediaries. Again, the intermediaries' vital role as connectors is visually clear: 
the majority of trade flowing between these cliques goes through the intermediaries. As 
one can see from the images, five countries serve as Gatekeepers, or trade intermediaries, 
between these two large trading cliques: the United States, Japan, West Germany, the 
United Kingdom, and ~ a k i s t a n . ~ ~  Except for a few stray connections, almost all cross- 
clique trade relationships must go through these five countries. Notice that not all of 
these countries would be considered Hubs, especially Pakistan. In Chapter 5 we shall 
engage in a more rigorous discussion of Gatekeepers, but for now the reader should be 
thinking about the ramifications of a country being involved in both cliques. 
86 Following our pattern established earlier, when the image of the network may not be apparent with 
country labels, we first present the image of the network, and then the image of the network with country 
labels. We do so in order to best visualize the structure of the system and to best visualize the locations of 
components of the system. 
87 While it may be hard to tell visually, much less trade goes through Pakistan than through the other 
connectors. 
Figure 21: The First of Two k=6 Latent Cliques in 1962, with Country Labels 
Figure 22: The Second of Two k=6 Latent Cliques in 1962, with Country Labels 
Figure 23: Two k=6 Latent Cliques in 1962 
Figure 24: Two k=6 Latent Clique in 1962, with Countries Labeled 
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As we approach the lowest k-cliques, the cliques increasingly approach the macro 
system structure, with Hub-Spoke Systems emerging. In Figures 27, 28, 29, and 30, we 
show the same k-4 clique fiom 1962. Figures 27 and 28 are unweighted; Figures 27 and 
29 do not have country labels. Notice that in each of the figures, the Hub countries are 
concentrated in the middle of each diagram, with Spoke countries increasingly distant 
from the center. In Figures 29 and 30 in particular, notice the heavy, black relationships 
emerging from the Hub countries; one can see how removing the United States or the 
United Kingdom and their many substantial trade relationships would destabilize the 
network, while removing Poland or Czechoslovakia would only impact a few countries, 
and only very lightly. 
(This area has intentionally been left blank.) 
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Figure 31: A k=lO Latent Clique in 1982, with Country Labels 
The international system is composed of many different types of formalized 
cliques and latent cliques. These represent some cliques that we would be able to 
recognize using traditional means of analysis and those that we would not be able to 
recognize. In Figures 32-35, a k=6 latent clique is presented. Following precedent 
established in other parts of the thesis, in Figures 32 and 33 we show the clique with 
unweighted relationships while in Figures 32 and 34 we have removed country labels so 
the reader can better observe the network structure. Notice how the nations in the clique 
all come from several different geographic areas, how the nations also come from both 
the Communist and NATO blocs, as well as the Third World bloc, and how the nations 
represent a whole range of different cultures. Such a grouping would not be analyzed 
had we chosen to only investigate geographically regional country groupings or 
formalized trade blocs. 
Figure 32: A k=6 Latent Clique in 1982 
lrel d hF* 
Iceland 
Gabon 
Figure 33: A k=6 Latent Clique in 1982, with Country Labels 
Figure 34: A k=6 Latent Clique, with Weighted Relationships 
JSSF 
A- 
Figure 35: A k=6 Latent Clique, with Weighted Relationships and Country Labels 
Latent cliques need not always bring together different and unique countries. In 
another k 6  latent clique fiom 1982, its membership is dominated by members of the 
Communist bloc. The relationship is displayed in Figures 36. One interesting note is that 
West Germany and East Germany do not seem to trade with each other, but they are only 
separated by two degrees: Yugoslavia, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the Soviet 
Union all serve as intermediaries for trade flows between the two nations. 
Germany 
, , \ \>-polar 
Figure 36: A Second k=6 Latent Clique in 1982, with Country Labels 
In Figures 37-40, we show the interactions of the two latent cliques. From the 
country-labeled networks in Figures 38 and 40, one can observe that the Communist bloc 
is concentrated in the bottom section of the graph. Interestingly, the NATO countries 
have positioned themselves to be the intermediaries between the Communist bloc and the 
rest of the nations of the world. These diagrams show economic containment. Perhaps 
because of their centrality to the international system, the NATO bloc survived, while the 
Communist bloc is no longer with us. In other words, for Marx's revolution to succeed, 
either (1) some of these central countries had to be success~lly overthrown; or (2) the 
Communist countries had to be better occupy the central sections of the overlap; or (3) 
the notion of the national economy gave rise to a unified economic system.88 
(This area has intentionally been left blank.) 
88 On this third possibility, Hirst and Thompson convincingly show that the international economic system 
is one of inter-nationalization rather than one of globalization, as the national markets are the main 
component of the economic system (2002). Marx, however, expected globalization to supplant national 
markets with the unification of workers across the world. This movement was the basis of the Marxist 
revolution. 
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Latent Submacro Systems in 2002 
The period between 1982 and 2002 saw dramatic shifts that changed long- 
standing conditions of world politics. There are two conditions that are especially 
notable. First, the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the fall of the Soviet Union symbolized 
the conclusion of the Cold War. Following the Cold War, the next decade would be one 
where integration of the international economic system was celebrated and championed. 
The second condition affecting international politics was the spread of free trade. 
Attempts were made to integrate the formerly-Communist countries into the larger 
economic system; the GATT - reborn in 1995 as the World Trade Organization (WTO) - 
encouraged cooperation and free trade amongst the nations of the world, while 
governmental- and non-governmental-organizations alike helped to speed the economic 
development of several less-developed countries. In addition, technological advances 
changed our interactions at the individual level by bringing us closer together, in no 
doubt affecting the proximity among nations as well. The chart in Figure 41 shows just 
how much more interconnected the nations of the world have become over time. Taking 
the normalized average degree of separation from 1962-2003, we see a gradual drop in 
the amount of separation, with a recent increase following 2001 .89 This graph shows that 
the small world phenomenon is not contained to individuals, and that the world is on 
track to become even smaller. 
89 We explain how the Normalized Average Degree of Separation Across Time is produced in Appendix A. 
We especially had to control for the number of countries in the international system, which has increased 
considerably over the past forty years. Despite the fact that we control for the existence of more countries, 
we still see a trend towards increasing interconnection. We speculate that this increase is the result of the 
9-1 1 terrorist attacks in Chapter 5. 
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Figure 41: Normalized Average Degrees of Separation Across Time 
Between 1982 and 2002, to say that several changes happened in the context of 
the international system is an understatement. But we again see that for the most part, 
membership in our high-k clique remains unchanged. How is the international system 
changing? Recall in Figure 20, we presented the highest k-clique from 1962, a k=9 
clique. The countries displayed remarkable equality in their submacro system, forming 
an Egalitarian Subsystem. In Figure 42, the k=10 clique is presented in unweighted form. 
From the k-9 latent clique from 1962, only Switzerland dropped out, and it was replaced 
by two other European countries, Sweden and Finland. In Figure 43, we include 
relationship weights for the same k=10 clique. Something very interesting is happening 
here. Of the ten countries that make up the top echelon of trade, the quality of the trade 
relationships no longer takes the form of an Egalitarian Subsystem. At least four of the 
countries - Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands and Spain - have much lighter lines 
compared to their rich counterparts. These countries in particular should be concerned 
with their tenuous foothold in the upper echelons of the trade system hierarchy. 
Figure 42: A k=10 Latent Clique in 2002, with Country Labels 
den 
1 Netherlands 
Figure 43: A k=10 Latent Clique in 2002, with Weighted Relationships and Country Variables 
Robert Gilpin calls the time period following World War I1 the Pax Americana, 
where the United States assumed the leading role in the international system, a system 
which he identified as one of Hegemony and single-node domination (Gilpin, 1984). 
However, Pax Americana in terms of trade seems to be a post-1962 development. If we 
look at the degree distributions of the top ten countries in 1965 and 2000, it appears as 
though the United States has increasingly separated itself from the rest of the pack during 
this time period. 
Table 3: Top Ten Countries in 1965 and 2000 in Terms of Degrees in the International Trade System 
That this change has occurred in conjunction with the rise of free trade is 
puzzling. One of the purported benefits of free trade is that it should create a more stable 
system by increasing economic flows throughout the international system. The logic of 
free trade also suggests that through increased trade, the absolute wealth of a given nation 
will increase, benefiting the elements within a nation. However, the relative position of 
the nation in the international system changes as well. Free trade may be making some 
countries rise at the expense of isolating others. This may just be the tip of the iceberg: to 
fairly weigh in on the consequences of free trade in the international system, more 
research needs to be done using graph theory. 
In 2002, CFinder identified sixteen different latent cliques: one k=10 clique, one 
k=9 clique, five k 8  cliques, one k=7 clique, one k=6 clique, four k=5 cliques, three k-4 
cliques, and one k=3 clique. In previous years, we would usually only observe Scale- 
Free Subsystem within the lower-k cliques, typically finding Egalitarian Subsystems in 
abundance among the higher-k cliques. However, throughout the cliques in 2002, there is 
a rise in the frequency of Hub-Spoke Subsystems, or subsystems common to a Scale-Free 
Network, with a few Hub nodes and several Spoke nodes. In Figures 44 and 45, we 
display a k=7 clique with weighted relationships, with Figure 44 having no country labels 
for visual purposes. Observe the centrality of certain Hubs, surrounded by a larger 
coterie of Spokes. In 1962, the countries in this latent clique would have been far more 
equal: we would not have been able to readily identify Hubs or Spokes. Instead, we can 
now observe that the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany are Hubs in this 
graph, while Ethiopia, Peru, and Lebanon are Spokes. Clearly, divides are becoming 
more prevalent in the subsystems, suggesting that divides may be more prevalent in the 
context of the international system as a whole. 
Figure 44: A k=7 Latent Clique in 2002 
Poland 
Figure 45: A Weighted k=7 Latent Clique in 2002, with Labels 
Chapter Summary 
Submacro systems cannot simply be defined along just one dimension: to capture 
all of the submacro systems prevalent in the international system, one must either 
examine all social, political, economic, and geographic groupings or one must use latent 
clique analysis. In this chapter, we have found some important characteristics by 
examining the structure of these latent submacro systems. Among these observations, we 
find that a high-level clique of Hubs exists at the top of the trade hierarchy. We also 
observe that certain countries serve vital inter-clique connecting roles, which make them 
particularly important for the stability and interaction of these groupings. We also see 
that some types of cliques are more homogeneous than others in terms of trade-sharing. 
Some cliques are Egalitarian Submacro Systems, while others resemble the international 
order by appearing as Hub-Spoke Submacro Systems. In 2002, several more Hub-Spoke 
Submacro Systems appeared, even amongst the higher-k cliques, suggesting that even 
among the rich nations of the world, hierarchies are forming and gradients are being 
created that did not exist before. Such changing dynamics may be prevalent throughout 
all types of cliques, both latent and formalized. In the next chapter, we further examine 
the findings of the submacro analysis, with the express desire of identifying the 
hierarchical structure of the international trade system. In the following chapter, we 
consider the commonalities between both latent and formalized subsystems. We W h e r  
explore the effects of these subsystem characteristics upon nations and upon the 
international system. 
CHAPTER 5: INTERDEPENDENCY IN THE 
INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM 
Overview 
In this chapter, we examine the roles of international organizations in the 
international trade system. We proceed by considering the best macro level 
organizational form for reducing contagion. We then examine the effects of trade blocs 
on member nations, finding that the principle of varying interdependence affects the 
success of trade blocs. 
Stability in a Scale- Free Network 
In Chapter 3, we provided evidence that the macro trading system adheres to a 
Scale-Free Network, meaning that it is a network in which there are a few large Hubs 
surrounded by many more inferior nodes, or Spokes (see Figures 14 and 15). What does 
a Scale-Free Network suggest for system stability? Cohen, Erez, ben-Avraham, and 
Havlin examine the Internet, also a Scale-Free Network, in the context of stability (2001). 
They find that if a node is randomly removed from such a network, the system should not 
be tremendously affected unless the node removed happens to be a Hub. Albert, et al., 
confirm these findings, showing that a Scale-Free Network is highly resilient to random 
events (2002). Since there are a small number of Hubs in such a network, a random 
event usually should affect Spoke countries, and therefore should not upset the system. 
However, when a Hub does get removed, the entire system suffers tremendously. 
Newman discusses how the removal of a Hub affects the network's resilience (2003). By 
removing a Hub, the typical length of the paths between other nodes increases, ultimately 
making vertex pairs disconnected and separated (ibid). Flows drastically slow down, not 
just between the Hub and its corresponding nodes, but among all nodes in the system 
(Cohen, et al., 2001; Albert, et al., 2002; Newman, 2003). Fortunately, in a random 
setting, since a Hub is infrequently removed, a Scale-Free Network should be quite 
stable. However, Cohen, et al. and Albert, et al. both recognize that Internet Hubs are 
frequently targeted by hackers in non-random and intentional attacks (ibid). Similarly for 
the international trade system, the adverse effects of non-random targeting such as 
terrorism on trade are amplified when a Hub country is targeted. 
A natural case study is formed by the 9-1 1 terrorist attacks, which shut down the 
United States' political and economic capitols for several days. These attacks affected 
the entire trade network long after the initial United States' shutdown, as trade slowed 
and relationships were redrawn. Recalling the normalized average degree of separation 
figure in Chapter 4, the average degree of separation began to increase in 2001. Were 
these attacks to occur in another non-Hub country, we doubt the macro stability would 
have been so drastically affected. Consider that since 9-1 1, there have been 14,098 
terrorist incidents, with an estimated 19,418 casualties, according to the MIPT Terrorism 
Knowledge Base (2006).~' While these incidents are indeed tragic, none of them affected 
the overall macro trade network as drastically as the attacks on the United ~ t a t e s . ~ '  
Scale-Free Networks are incredibly resilient to random effects, but they are 
vulnerable to targeted attacks. Scale-Free Networks are also vulnerable to contagion 
effects, or cascading failures (Newman, 2003). Cascading failures are especially 
90 These numbers represent the number of terrorist incidents from September 12,2001 to April 30,2006. 
91 One who is suspicious of the claim that terrorist attacks on Hub countries impedes the international trade 
system can cite many examples of terrorist attacks against the United States that did not affect the trade 
system, including the Oklahoma City attacks and the various attacks on US embassies. However, in order 
for a terrorist attack to have the effect described above, the Hub needs to be removed from the system: the 
longer the amount of time the Hub is removed, the slower the flows in the international trade system. In 
the other cases, the United States was not so drastically removed from the system. 
detrimental in Random Networks with Gaussian distributions of degrees, but if they can 
proceed through the hierarchies in a Scale-Free Network, the cascade may be detrimental 
to the macro system (Watts, 2002). To understand how cascading failures may affect the 
trade network, lets consider the different hierarchy structures in the international system. 
In Chapter 3, we discussed the five hierarchies identified by Dodds, et al. in the 
international system (2004). In Figure 46, we re-display the hierarchies. These 
hierarchies are Random, Random Interdivisional, Core-Periphery, Local Team, and 
Multiscalar. 
I RID i 6 
Figure 46: Possible Hierarchical Structures from Watts, et al., 2004 
Looking at the macro system, we ruled out the possibility of a Random or a 
Random Interdivisional Hierarchy existing across the entire network, as we found that the 
macro system is actually a Scale-Free Network. However, Random Hierarchies and 
Random Interdivisional Hierarchies do exist at the submacro level, as do Core-Periphery 
Hierarchies and Local Team Hierarchies. Networks can have a variety of hierarchies, 
and when a network has multiple hierarchies, it enters the Multiscalar region. 
One should not simply accept the statement that all hierarchies are prevalent in 
the international trade system, however, as we have the means of demonstrating it. In 
order to determine the nature of the macro system, we have to examine the several 
international submacro systems. Three types of cliques emerge from our analysis, 
displaying a range of interdependence. Rosencrance and Stein identify at least three 
different ways in which interdependence has been previously conceived in IR: 
"In its most general sense, interdependence suggests a relationship of 
interests such that if one nation's position changes, other states will be 
affected by that change. A second meaning, derived fiom economics, 
suggests that interdependence is present when there is an increased 
national "sensitivity" to external economic developments ... The most 
stringent definition comes fiom Kenneth Waltz, who argues that 
interdependence entails a relationship that would be costly to break" 
(1978: 2). 
We adopt the most general sense of the term, that if one nation changes itself, 
other states will be affected by that change.92 The amount that a nation will be affected 
by another nation depends upon the form of interdependence. In terms of latent cliques, 
interdependence ranges from cliques with one Hub and several Spokes to cliques with 
multiple Hubs and several Spokes to cliques with several countries of the same 
hierarchical type. In each case, if one nation changes itself, other states will be differently 
affected by that change. 
The first clique formation we shall label a Pure-Dependent Submacro System. In 
this clique, a Hub country is crucial to tying the flow of international trade to the rest of 
92 In reading the literature, we were struck by the number of authors who would discuss interdependence 
without defining the term. 
the clique and therefore, these Spoke countries are solely dependent upon the Hub. Take, 
for example, a k-4 latent clique from 2002, as shown in Figure 47. The other countries in 
the latent clique are functionally dependent upon the United States to connect to the 
larger trade network. Excluding the United States, the average clustering coefficient of 
the group is 0.6786, much higher than the United States' 0.4190 ~oeff ic ient .~~ As a 
result, power is heavily concentrated with the United States and we would expect to see 
the United States able to coerce these other countries if necessary. 
Figure 47: A k=4 Latent Clique from 2002, with Country Labels 
Hirschman empirically demonstrates that large trading countries have a 
preference to interact with smaller trading countries (1980). Hirschrnan explains that 
given two countries, a strong one (Country A), and a weak one (Country B), Country A 
has an interest in monopolizing the trade of Country B, and Country B has an interest in 
"splitting its trade equally among as many countries as possible in order to escape too 
great a dependence on one or two great markets or supply sources" (ibid: 85-86). The 
" This represents the United States' highest clustering coefficient. Again, we believe that part of this effect 
of increased United States insularity is due to the terrorist attacks the year before. 
logic for such a struggle is simple: trade dependencies give the dominant country the 
ability to affect the weak country, both in terms of economic coercion as well as social 
and political coercion. In addition to statistical analysis, Hirschrnan also offers a 
convincing case study in Nazi Germany. Hirschman observes that the Nazis used trade 
relations to first penetrate, and then dominate countries in several areas, especially in 
Southeast Europe. 
Hirschrnan's work is focused upon dyadic relationships, but his theories can be 
extrapolated for the rest of the international system, offering several interesting insights. 
For instance, having a large trade deficit is not so detrimental for a Hub if other countries 
are becoming increasingly dependent upon that country, particularly if that Hub is a 
Hegemon. The Hub is gaining relatively to the other countries in the system, making it 
more integral to the stability of the system. If that country collapses, other countries are 
equally in trouble. 
This clique formation most closely conforms to a Random Interdivisional 
Hierarchy, but it may occur within a larger Local Team, Core-Periphery, or Multiscalar 
Hierarchy. When a Random-Interdivisional Hierarchy is in place, a certain country may 
prove crucial to tying the horizontal flow of trade between two cliques. In Figures 48 and 
49, a hypothetical example is provided, stylized fiom real network analysis.94 We have 
presented it to better explain the Gatekeeper relationship we briefly mentioned in Chapter 
4. The left clique shows an Asian-based clique; the right clique includes several 
European nations. Notice how the United States serves as the key intermediary in trade 
between these two groupings. Such countries are Gatekeepers, as they have the ability to 
94 These images were made with incomplete data for 1965. When the missing data was included and the 
spring embedding displaying program was run, the relationship was not as apparent. Figures 44 and 45 
best show what we are trying to explain, but they should be considered illustrative, not factual. 
regulate interactions between the submacro groupings. Gatekeepers can influence other 
nations by their positions not just in the macro system, but also by their positions between 
cliques. Gatekeepers need not only be Hub countries. We observed Pakistan serving as 
one of many Gatekeepers in 1982. In the 1980s, aid flows to Afghanistan from the 
Soviets and the West made Afghanistan play a Gatekeeper role in the international aid 
system. Such a role as the intermediary helped Afghanistan avoid capitulating to Soviet 
coercion as the Western clique fought to protect its sovereignty during the Soviet 
invasion of the 1980s. 
Figure 48: Hypothetical Trade Clique Interactions 
LJapan 
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Figure 49: Hypothetical Trade Clique Interactions, with Country Labels 
Applying Hirschman7s logic to submacro system dynamics, dominant countries 
not only have an incentive to minimize other Gatekeepers, but they should strive to 
become Gatekeepers themselves. If a country can fully control a submacro system and 
serve as the submacro system's only link between those Spokes and the rest of the 
international order, that Hub country will rise in relative and absolute power. For the 
United States, such was the logic of the Monroe Doctrine of the 1800s. Discovering 
those isolated cliques in order to connect them with the larger world trade system also 
drives trade expansionism today in much the same way as colonialism and mercantilism 
influenced country policies over the last five-hundred years.95 
Further examining Hirschman7s paradigm, Hubs would have an interest in 
breaking down other Hubs' monopoly power, or at the minimum, Hubs would want to 
see trade relationships develop among a rival country's Spokes and the international 
system. For example, it is beneficial to the Europeans that Japan, China, and South 
Korea are increasingly competing against one another while vying for better positions in 
the macro system, so long as one of these countries does not emerge on top and so long 
as these countries do not join forces in some super-national structure. If China emerges 
as the dominant country in East Asian trading circles, with subordinates of the caliber of 
Japan and South Korea, China would instantly enjoy greater position in the trade system. 
We do find cliques with multiple Hubs. In these cliques, Spoke countries are not 
completely dependent upon a sole Hub and connect to the international system through 
an alternate route. As a result, if one Hub introduces a form of coercion on the Spoke, 
the Spoke has the ability to resist by turning to the other Hub, tempering the coercive 
95 The key difference being that a Hub country will typically tolerate a higher level of autonomy to a Spoke 
country's domestic sphere, recognizing that it is in the Hub country's interest to have the Spoke country 
enjoy and support the involvement of the Hub country. 
ability of the original Hub. Within such a submacro clique, there is a system in effect 
whereby each Spoke has a level of autonomy from its multiple Hub partners, and thus we 
classify such clique relationships as a Multi-Dependent Submacro System. One such 
clique, a k 5  clique from 1984 is presented in Figure 50. Notice how West Germany and 
the United States, each with high clustering coefficients and significant trade 
participation across the world, share the markets of Costa Rica, Guatemala and El 
Salvador. In such a condition, the Spoke countries are stronger because if one Hub 
country engages in coercion, the Spoke countries may turn to the other Hub country for 
assistance. However, compared to the Gatekeeper relationship, if one Hub country 
cannot push the other Hub country out of the submacro system, the two Hub countries are 
likely to increasingly cooperate, forming an oligopoly (Hirschman, 1980). 
Figure 50: A k=5 Latent Clique from 1984, with Country Labels 
Finally, there are latent cliques that are made up of countries which are mutually 
dependent upon one another. Most of the high value k-cliques are such communities, and 
they are usually solely comprised of Hub countries. The latent clique presented in Figure 
51 is one such clique. This clique formation is an Equal-Dependent Submacro System, 
whereby the resilience of the system is highly contingent upon each of the members of 
the community. These upper-level cliques are the closest approximations of Egalitarian 
Networks observed in the international trade system. 
Figure 51: A k=9 Latent Clique from 1964, with Labels 
In terms of hierarchical possibilities, such a clique displays high homophily, or 
high interconnection between its members. This clique is necessary for a Scale-Free 
Network, and it is necessary for Multiscalar, Local Team, and Core-Periphery 
Hierarchies. Such a small and exclusive latent clique would not be found in the Random 
or Random Interdivisional Hierarchies as it would not occur in a purely Random 
~ e t w o r k . ~ ~  
Combined, this evidence suggests that a Multiscalar Hierarchy exists, as we do 
see elements of Random Interdivisional and Random Hierarchies, as well as elements of 
Core-Periphery and Local Team Hierarchies. Just as we would expect in a Multiscalar 
Hierarchy, we do observe some level of homophily, or horizontal trade, but we also 
96 A clique like this one may occur in an Egalitarian Network if the population was limited to only these 
countries. 
observe a significant amount of vertical trade as well. As one moves vertically up the 
hierarchy, higher and higher levels of homophily are present. 
We shall now put the components together. Recall the upper echelon k-cliques 
and the countries with the top ten degree distributions in Chapter 4. The macro system is 
governed by a network of such Hubs heavily interacting with one another. Typically, the 
Hubs are European or Western, but in recent times, other countries such as India and 
China have joined the higher levels of trade. In Figure 52, we display the theoretical 
structure of the upper echelon, as justified by our macro and submacro level analyses. It 
is not surprising that such a structure resembles what we would expect in a Balance of 
Power System, with several Hubs of approximately equal trade capabilities. 
Hub I Hub 2 Hub 3 
Figure 52: The Theoretical Upper-Echelon 
In Figure 53 and Figure 54, we present two theoretical double-level, Multiscalar 
hierarchies distinct from those of Dodds, et al. In Figure 53, we offer an international 
system with only Pure-Dependent Submacro relationships in the vertical frame. In Figure 
54, we depict an international system laden with Multi-Dependent relationships. The 
edge thickness in each Figure represents the homophily: notice that the edges between the 
Hubs are thicker than the edges between the Hubs and Spokes. Also, in the real-world 
hierarchy, there are many levels, with intermediary components connecting countries in a 
far more complex pattern than what is presented below. We posit that the international 
system lies somewhere in between these two structures, with the modern-day trend 
approaching Figure 54 as the degrees of separation between nations reduces. We suspect 
this transition because in our analysis, we do see a drop in the average degree of 
separation, and in the real-world we do hear of greater involvement by Hubs in so-called 
"emerging markets." 
- - 
Hub 1 Hub 2 Hub 3 
Figure 53: The Upper-Echelon with Spokes Connected Through Pure-Dependent Submacro 
Relationships 
Figure 54: The Upper-Echelon with Spokes Connected Through Multi-Dependent Submacro 
Relationships 
Hub 1 
Reconsidering cascading failures, in either structure such contagion effects should 
tend to spread either horizontally or descend through the system. Additionally, due to the 
Hub 2 
high homophily in the upper echelons of the trade hierarchy, the upper echelon members 
Hub 3 
should be more or less resilient when faced with bottom-up disturbances depending on 
this homophily relative to the amount and depth of interconnections between the Hubs 
and the Spokes. 
Some Shortcomings in Graph Theory 
We closed Chapter 4 by mentioning that we are potentially observing increasing 
stratification in the higher echelons of the trade hierarchy. If this stratification were to 
increase substantially, the upper-most echelon would not be filled by a group of 
countries, but instead one country would occupy the upper spot. This change would be 
nothing short of a shift from a Balance of Power System to a Universal System of 
Hegemony (Kaplan, 1957). What would happen to system stability if we saw the rise of 
Hegemony? Graph theory is still an emerging discipline, and it was not initially 
developed as a tool for understanding the international trade network. For this project, 
we scanned the major journals in graph theory,97 we read the defining books,98 and we 
talked to scholars from across disciplines.99 Between all of these sources, we were able 
to answer many questions utilizing the techniques of graph theory, but by analyzing 
international trade, we stumbled across several of the current limitations of the 
disciplined that should be addressed in the coming years. What follows are some 
observations on these limitations. 
97 The Journal of Social Structure, Physical Review Letters, and The Proceedings of the National 
Academies of the Sciences are among those major journals. 
98 Barabhsi's Linked: The New Science of Networks (2002) and Watts' Six Degrees: The Science of a 
Connected Age (2003) are the best starting points. 
99 In addition to the biologist (Ramy h o u t ) ,  the electrical engineer (Behram Mistree), and the 
mathematician (Han Yin Lin) mentioned in the acknowledgements, we also engaged in discussions of 
graph theory informally with several graduate students in MITYs Engineering Systems Division (ESD) and 
even with a Sloan doctoral candidate, all of whom had pursued approaches to graph theory in the contexts 
of their own fields. 
If we saw a rise in Hegemony, we speculate that trade stability in such a 
Hegemonic System would depend upon the stability of the Hegemon, but we would also 
expect the countries in the next-highest echelon to somehow cooperate to resist the 
Hegemon. Further research in graph theory needs to be conducted in this arena to 
address issues of Hegemonic stability and other Multiscalar hierarchical possibilities. 
Along these lines, more research in graph theory needs to be conducted on 
evolving net~orks. ' '~ Most networks are static in the sense that their structure does not 
change over time. From 1965 to 2000, we found that the overall structure of the 
international system has remained a Scale-Free Network, but we do recognize that there 
have been changes in hierarchical structures (especially in submacro groupings), and we 
also recognize that the hierarchical structure may be changing so drastically that the 
macro system may be affected.''' Advances in understanding why networks change and 
understanding the ramifications of these evolving networks would be extremely relevant 
to our analysis. 
Chapter Summary: Reconsidering the East Asian Crisis 
In Chapter 1, we opened this thesis with a discussion about the spread of 
economic collapse across several East-Asian economies. During this event, looming in 
the background was the fear that the spread of economic collapse would afflict the larger 
countries in the Asian economic sphere, potentially bringing about international 
depression. Would such cascading failure have been possible? Our findings in Chapter 5 
suggest that such failure would not have been possible as contagion rarely percolates 
Unfortunately, the title for such a work has already been taken by Dorogovtsev and Mendes, who have 
written a book entitled Evolution of Networks (2003), but the content of the book is about the evolution of 
y p h  theory rather than how networks may change. 
Rumored among studentsat ESD is that changing networks will soon be a primary focus of research in 
their labs. 
upwards. Interestingly, we are supported by traditional statistical methodologies. 
Thanyalakpark and Filson find that the collapse of the Asian region's equity markets 
displayed interdependence, but little contagion effects (2001). Unfortunately, 
Thanyalakpark and Filson do not define interdependence, nor do they recognize variances 
in interdependence. Without considering trade hierarchy positioning, Thanyalakpark and 
Filson only paint half of the picture. 
In the next chapter, we shall examine solutions for network stability at the macro 
level. We shall also examine the effects of formalized submacro institutions (in terms of 
trade blocs) on their member countries, finding again that interdependence affects not just 
the trade hierarchy of the member countries, but also the success of the trade bloc itself. 
CHAPTER 6: INSTITUTIONS IN THE INTERNATIONAL 
SYSTEM 
overvie w702 
From the World Trade Organization to the North American Free Trade 
Agreement to the Association of South-East Asian Nations, macro and submacro 
institutions have been formed to aid the flow of international trade and to encourage free 
trade where it did not exist beforehand. In this chapter, we consider policy solutions to 
contagions through institutions at the macro level, and then we consider the effects of 
submacro institutions in the form of trade blocs on member countries. 
Macro International Institutions For Stability 
The last chapter ended inconclusively: after a long analysis of macro and 
submacro systems, we offered no substantial recommendations to protect against 
cascading failures. We did find from the graph theory literature that economic failure in 
a Multiscalar Hierarchy should flow horizontally and top-down, but it will rarely spread 
in a bottom-up manner. Indeed, for contagion to spread upwards, a Hub needs to be 
overly dependent upon countries lower in the hierarchy, and if that is the case, the 
homophily between that Hub and other Hubs would be low, preventing failure from 
spreading horizontally. But we made no useful policy recommendations. 
Until this point, we have avoided considering international institutions. In our 
analysis at the macro level, we purposely assumed that nations existed in an anarchic 
state to determine the most appropriate network structure. Had we assumed that an 
102 The research in this chapter is still a work-in-progress. In the interests of provoking a discussion, 
however, we have included as much findings from the data as possible, even if the analysis still leaves 
something to be desired. As a result, the reader should consider this argument a stylized description rather 
than a robust analysis. 
international organization or some other overlying structure completely controlled the 
international trade system, a graph theory approach would not be advisable. Similarly, in 
our analysis at the submacro level, we examined latent submacro systems rather than 
formalized trade blocs or political alliances. Had we looked at institutions at either of 
these levels, we would not have been able to discover the network structure or the 
hierarchy of countries, and we would not have been able to identify the nature of stability 
in the trade system. 
However, it is now useful to consider the effects of international institutions on 
the system's stability, and whether international institutions may contribute to the 
international system's capacity. In "Stability and Instability in the International System," 
Rosencrance defines capacity as "a generic term designating the total ability of the 
international system to contain disruption" (Rosencrance, 1963: 280). For Rosencrance, 
there are regulative and environmental forces which augment capacity. For our purposes, 
regulative forces stop economic failures before they happen; environmental forces control 
the spread and extent of economic failures. For both forces, international cooperation is 
needed, usually conceived in the form of international institutions. 
In "International Institutions for Reducing Global Financial Instability," Rogoff 
makes just such an argument (1999). Rogoff examines possible institutional structures 
for maintaining equilibrium conditions and preventing cascading failures in financial 
markets. Even though he does not consider trade explicitly, Rogoff is concerned with 
economic stability, and therefore it is worth looking at the solutions that he identifies 
fkom the larger literature. Among these solutions are establishing various Lenders of Last 
Resort, who would offer loans to a country if the country were bordering on fiscal 
insolvency, establishing an International Bankruptcy Court which would restructure a 
fiscally insolvent country's debt so that all creditors could be paid without a mad 
scramble, and forming some sort of global financial hegemonic force by either creating a 
world monetary authority or by controlling capital flows. These institutions provide both 
regulative and environmental forces for increasing system capacity. But we must 
consider the externalities of preserving system capacity. 
There are two ways in which an international institution may augment system 
capacity. First, if an institution is created that simply protects the system stability by 
equally protecting every nation, we may see the onset of a Random Network of 
international trade. Recall that a Random Network has a Gaussian distribution of trade 
relationships, with some countries having few or many degrees, but with most countries 
having a middle amount of degrees. Chance disturbances in a Random Network do have 
larger effects to the system as it is more likely that a random effect will involve a country 
ingrained in the system. In other words, where a random disturbance in a Scale-Free 
Network is likely to affect a country with only one or two degrees, a chance disturbance 
in a Random Network is likely to affect a country with more degrees. Additionally, 
Rogoff explains that by creating institutions that would protect every nation, we provide 
incentives to nations to take larger risks. These incentives encourage instability as a 
nation may decide to take larger gambles. 
If the main purpose of such international tinkering is to maintain the system 
stability of the overall network, the best policy recommendation would ensure that the 
countries in the upper echelons of the trade hierarchy were protected fiom failure more so 
than the countries in the lower echelons. This introduces the second structure of an 
institution devoted to increasing system capacity. Creating such a protectorate 
mechanism opens up a Pandora's Box of problems however, as nations would not be 
protected equally. This may make the lower-level nations band together to overthrow the 
structure of the system.lo3 Even if the lower-level nations did not band together, selecting 
the countries which belong to the "upper echelon" would be a contentious and bitter 
political struggle. Nations would not only have an incentive to improve their own trade 
relationships, but they would also have an incentive to sour competitor nations' trade 
positions. Amid this jockeying, there would be incentives to instability as countries 
would seek their own stability at the cost of the international system's stability.'" 
Ensuring that the international trade hierarchy is maintained in its status quo form is 
dangerous in and of itself When faced with the tradeoffs, perhaps preserving system 
stability through a macro institution is overrated. 
Submacro Institutions in the International System 
Whether or not international institutions promote stability or instability in the 
context of a trade hierarchy, certain international institutions have the ability to affect the 
wellbeing of their member states. The extent to which international groupings affect their 
member states, however, is a topic of hot debate. On the one hand, institutionalists and 
integrationists such as Keohane argue that supranational institutions play a vital role in 
transforming a nation's economic and political structures. Once countries cooperate in 
terms of trade, they will have no choice but to synchronize other capabilities, such as the 
legal system or the monetary system, with such spill-over effects increasing the strength 
- -- - - 
lo3 Such lower-level cooperation is not without precedent. The term 'Third-World" has come to represent 
developing countries, but originally it referred to a group of countries not allied with the West or the 
Soviets during the Cold War. They banded together to represent their interests in the international political 
system, and in so doing, they sought to break political Bipolarity into political Multipolarity. 
l M  Forming a tragedy of the commons. 
of the submacro structure at the expense of national autonomy. As a result, once a trade 
grouping is formed, we should see the member countries in that trade group progress 
towards unification in a political-economic institutional bloc such as the EU. On the 
other hand, intergovernmentalists argue that member countries only form trade groups to 
the extent that trade groups advance their individual interests (Moravcsik, 2005). 
Intergovernmentalists believe that joining a trade group will not necessarily result in 
unification, as member countries will maintain their respective autonomies if that is in 
their best national interest. Furthermore, in this framework, we would expect trade 
groups to be dissolved if the members were not prospering. Intergovernmentalists are 
cynical about the effects of spill-over, as they argue that countries may resist submacro 
unification. The core difference between the integrationists and the intergovernmentalists 
is whether trade blocs automatically help the member nations (Puchala, 1999). 
Integrationists argue that spill-overs are inevitable and the trade bloc will expand to 
political and social spheres because the member nations of the trade bloc will thrive in 
their formalized relationship. Intergovernmentalists argue that trade blocs do not always 
lead to increased wealth and better international positioning. Hence, institutionalists 
believe that supranational unification is inevitable while intergovemrnentalists believe 
that unification is a state-controlled process that will only happen in certain situations. 
At the heart of both frameworks is a belief that interdependence can yield 
common benefits (Keohane, 1984). In this literature, interdependence usually means 
mutual connections with between two or more countries. However, in our literature 
review, we did not find any evidence that integrationists or intergovernmentalists 
conceived of interdependence as a spectrum, as we found to be the case in Chapter 5. As 
a result, we find that unification occurs in certain situations and does not occur in others, 
suggesting that the intergovernmentalist framework may be correct. Let us examine 
firther. 
Figure 55 presents the global average clustering coefficient over time. Recall that 
the clustering coefficient is the likelihood that a country's partners trade with one 
another. Over time, the average global clustering coefficient has dropped, suggesting that 
certain Hubs are linking countries that were not previously connected. 
Average Clustering Coefficient Across Time 
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Figure 55: The Global Average Clustering Coefficient Across Time 
If we treat trading blocs as their own separate systems, we find that the average 
clustering coefficient increases rather than decreases, regardless of whether or not they 
are officially linked in a trade bloc. This is not so surprising: countries that form trading 
blocs tend to share trade relationships even before they formalize such an institution. In 
Figures 56, 57, 58, 59 and 60, shown below, the data from five such trading blocs are 
presented: the Asian-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Association of South- 
East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the EU, the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas 
(FTAA), and the Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR).~~~ To make these graphs, 
we took all of the member countries for each year even before they were members. With 
the EU, for instance, while only six countries were members in 1962, we included all 25 
current EU members to calculate the 1962 observation. While the EU has gone through 
many incarnations and revivals since it was first formed in 1957, the FTAA formed in 
1994 with all thirty-four current members joining at once. Similarly, all four members of 
MERCOSUR formally linked in 1994. APEC and ASEAN both experienced members 
join the trading group after formal inception, with APEC starting in 1989, and ASEAN 
starting in 1967. 
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Figure 56: Clustering Coefficient of APEC Across Time 
105 We are currently performing this analysis for all the trade blocs included in UNCTAD and Corntrade to 
see whether this relationship holds across all trade groups. We should also calculate average clustering 
coefficients of latent cliques to observe whether such patterns are trade bloc-specific. 
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Figure 57: Clustering Coefficient of ASEAN Across Time 
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Figure 58: Clustering Coefficient of EU Across Time 
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Figure 59: Clustering Coefficient of FTAA Across Time 
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Figure 60: Clustering Coefficient of MERCOSUR Across Time 
APEC's average clustering coefficient has increased over the past forty years; 
despite large-scale fluctuations due to fewer nation-members, ASEAN's average 
clustering coefficient also seems to be on the rise. However, throughout the EU's recent 
existence, the average clustering coefficient seems to have remained relatively constant. 
Similarly, examining the FTAA, the clustering coefficient average has stayed relatively 
constant: if the 1962 observation is removed, the average clustering coefficient before 
1994 is 0.7392, while the average clustering coefficient from 1994 to 2003 is 0.7322. 
MERCOSUR evinces the same results, suggesting that countries do not always discover 
new trading partners once they are formally connected in a trade group. 
Nonetheless, we do sometimes see an increase in intra-group trade, which can be 
considered as measures of the groups' homophilies. The following table is adapted from 
the UNCTAD Handbook of Statistics. The last column was calculated by taking the 
average year in which member countries joined the group. For the complete listing of 
countries required for the last column, Appendix B includes the countries in each trade 
bloc and their years of accession. Table 3 shows the Intra-Trade of Trade Groups as 
Percentage of Total Exports of Each Trade Grouping, in many cases chronicling the 
increase in intra-group trade with the onset of a trading bloc.lo6 
106 The numbers in this table were calculated by UNCTAD, by simply using our major trade 
relationship data. 
Trade Group 1990 Acronym 
. . 
1960 
. . 
2002 
1985.6 
1980 
Average 
Year of 
Country 
Accession 
. . 
1960 
. . 
2002 
1957 
2002 
EUROPE 
Year of 
Formation 
Baltic countries 
European Free 
Trade Association 
European Union 
(1 5) 
Euro Zone of the 
European Union 
European Union 
(25) 
AMERICAS 
EFTA 
EU (15) 
Euro Zone 
EU (25) 
.. 
0.8 
65.9 
55.1 
67.9 
. . 
1.1 
60.8 
51.4 
60.9 
13.1 
0.6 
61 
49.8 
66.6 
4.1 
15.3 
8.1 
46.6 
11.6 
8.9 
41.4 
8.1 
3.8 
24.4 
5.3 
43.4 
13.9 
11.6 
33.6 
Andean Group 
Central American 
Common Market 
Caribbean 
Community 
Free Trade Area of 
the Americas 
Latin American 
Integration 
Association 
Southern Common 
Market 
North American 
Free Trade 
Agreement 
ANCOM 
CACM 
CARICOM 
FTAA 
LAIA 
MERCOSUR 
NAFTA 
10.6 
11.5 
13.5 
60.7 
13.6 
17.7 
56 
3.8 
Organization of 
Eastern Caribbean 
States 
AFRICA 
Economic 
Community of the 
Great Lakes 
Countries 
Common Market 
for Eastern and 
Southern Africa 
Economic 
Community of 
Central African 
States 
Economic 
Community of West 
Afican States 
Mano River Union 
Southern Afican 
Development 
Community 
1976 
1994 
1983 
1975 
1973 
1992 
1976 
1994 
1984.5 
1975.1 
1973 
1992.1 
1996 
1961 
1973 
1994 
1980 
1994 
1992 
-----
1981 OECS 
CEPGL 
COMESA 
ECCAS 
ECOWAS 
MRU 
SADC 
1996 
1961.8 
1977.3 
1994 
1980 
1994 
1992 
1982.9 9 
0.1 
5.7 
1.4 
9.6 
0.8 
0.4 
0.5 
6.3 
1.4 
8 
0 
3.1 
0.7 
5.6 
1.3 
11.1 
0.3 
8.8 
Economic and 
Monetary 
Community of 
Central Afi-ica 
Arab Maghreb 
Union 
West African 
Economic and 
Monetary Union 
I Gulf Cooperation council l GCC 
UEMOA 
Association of 
South-East Asian 
Nations 
Bangkok 
Agreement 
Economic 
Cooperation 
Organization 
INTERREGIONAL 
9.9 
ASEAN 
Bangkok 
ECO 
Melanesian 
Spearhead Group 
South Asian 
Association for 
Regional 
Cooperation 
13 
I Independent States 1 CIS . . . . 
Table 4: Intra-Trade of Trade Groups as Percentage of Tota 
17.4 
1.7 
6.3 
MSG 
SAARC 
Asia Pacific 
Economic 
Cooperation 
Black Sea 
Economic 
Cooperation 
Commonwealth of 
19 
1.6 
3.2 
Of the five trading groups that we first considered, APEC, FTAA, and 
0.8 
4.8 
APEC 
BSEC 
18.9 
MERCOSUR all experience steep increases in intra-group trading once trade 
0.4 
3.2 
relationships are formalized. During this time period, intra-group trade also rises in the 
57.9 
5.9 
Exports of Each Trade Grouping 
1991 
68.4 
4.2 
1991 
EU and in ASEAN, though not as drastically. However, both of these trade blocs are 
much older and probably had high intra-group trade, even before formalization. At least 
eight other trade groups did not flourish when formalized. The Common Market for 
Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), the Economic Community of Central Afkican 
States (ECCAS), the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), FTAA, the Latin 
American Integration Association (LAIA), the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States 
(OECS), the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), and the Arab 
Maghreb Union (UMA) all remain relatively stagnant or drop in terms of intra-group 
trade when a trade bloc is formed. In Table 4, we present those trading groups that 
experience increased homophily with the onset of a trade grouping and those that see 
their intra-group trade remain stagnant or decrease. 
Table 5: Successful and Non-Successful Trade Blocs 
It seems as though in certain situations, institutionalization does make a difference 
in certain trade blocs, but not in others. Why do we see intra-group trade increase in 
some trade blocs while remaining constant or decreasing in others? Alternatively, why 
do we see the average clustering coefficient rise in some trade blocs while remaining 
constant in others? 
Improvement 
Andean 
APEC 
Bangkok 
BSEC 
CARICOM 
GCC 
MERCOSUR 
MSG 
NAFTA 
SADC 
UEMOA 
Indistinguishable 
ASEAN 
Baltic 
CACM 
CEPGL 
CIS 
ECOWAS 
EMCCA 
EU 
MRU 
Stagnancy or 
Reduction 
COMESA 
ECCAS 
ECO 
FTAA 
LAIA 
OECS 
SAARC 
UMA 
The answers may lie in the memberships of these trading blocs. In Appendix B, 
we present a complete listing of the members in each bloc. For the purposes of 
simplicity, let us now examine four of these trading blocs, using a stylized approach. In 
Figures 61, 62, 63, and 64, we show the normalized average degrees of the member 
countries of four trade groups - APEC, FTAA, the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA), and SAARC - before, during, and after trade formalization. In 
Chapters 2 and 3, we explained that each nation has a degree value which corresponds to 
the number of major trade relationships for a nation. We also argued that the number of 
degrees is a measure of the country's positioning in the trade system, with Hub countries 
having higher degrees and Spokes having fewer degrees.''' 
APEC Average Degree 
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Figure 61: Normalized Average Degrees of Countries in APEC Across Time 
107 We normalized the average degrees because in 1962 there are fewer countries than in 2002. In order to 
show that our findings do not simply uncover this fact that we live in a world of more countries, we 
controlled this effect by dividing by the average number of degrees per year. Again, each chart is created 
by averaging the number of degrees of all of the current member countries for each year; as a result, even 
when there is no institution, there will be average degrees if any of the countries exist. 
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Figure 62: Normalized Average Degree of Countries in FTAA Across Time 
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Figure 64: Normalized Average Degrees of Countries in SAARC Across Time 
APEC, FTAA, and NAFTA all experience a rise in their average degrees, while 
SAARC experiences a decline, suggesting that the member countries of SAARC are 
dropping in the international trade system relative to other countries. However, these 
trade blocs may resemble other submacro groupings in that some blocs may be 
dominated by a strong power, while others are a composite of equal countries. Not 
surprisingly, the presence of the United States in the first three trade groups drastically 
affects the results of the previous figures. Figures 65, 66, 67, and 68 show the how the 
average degree changes for each country once it joins a trade grouping. Notice that most 
countries are relatively even, except for the presence of the United States in the first three 
charts. What we see is the dominance of the United States in APEC, in the FTAA, and 
even in NAFT.A, while other countries remain relatively stagnant or drop. Following its 
accession into these three trading blocs, the United States in particular gains as Spoke 
countries increasingly engaged in trade relationships with this Hub. The United States 
takes the most advantage of trade bloc formalization. 
I 
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Figure 65: Degrees of Members in APEC Across Time 
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NAFTA. But if one removes the success of the United States from APEC, the FLU, or 
even NAFTA, one finds a story similar to that of SAARC, with homogeneity and 
stagnancy among the non-Hub countries in the trading bloc. In Figure 69, we exclude the 
United States from the chart and again look at the countries of the FTAA. 
FTAA Members Excluding USA 
Figure 69: Degrees of Members in FTAA Across Time, Excluding the United States 
This time, Brazil and Argentina are the crown jewels of the FTAA, representing 
the countries with the highest normalized degrees. But following FTAA formalization, 
both countries did not significantly deviate from their trajectories, consistently fluctuating 
over time. Only the United States prospered. 
This pattern of Hub dominance in a trade group is to be expected. Consider 
Hirschman's discussion about how Hubs want to develop trade monopolization with 
Spokes in order to be able to exercise both economic and political power (1980). 
Formalizing a trade bloc allows the Hub to accomplish this activity, as the Spokes 
become increasingly dependent upon the Hub. When a singular Hub country is involved 
in the trade group, the Hub country enjoys a corresponding rise in degrees and intra- 
group trade increases, but we do not see non-Hub countries advance. 
Even when countries are equal and there seems to be a high form of 
interdependence, the formalization of a trading group among the countries may not bring 
about success. Hub countries need not necessarily be member of a specific trade group to 
affect all of the members in the trade group. From 1980 to 2002, the OECS saw its intra- 
group trade decrease from 9% to 3.8%. These nations of the Caribbean were 
undoubtedly affected by their neighborhood Hub, the United States, which became more 
active in the Caribbean economies during this time period. COMESA, which is 
composed of several small Ahcan nations that were former colonial states, is still 
dominated by Hubs, with many of these countries still trading with their former 
imperialists. 
Chapter Summary 
When it comes to the integrationist framework versus the intergovernmentalist 
framework, we find that differences in interdependencies influence whether trade bloc 
formalization improves the conditions of the member states. Trade bloc formalization 
will not necessarily benefit all member states, and we must approach the integrationist 
framework with suspicion. When a trade group is formed with countries that are 
relatively equal with one another in terms of their hierarchical positions in the 
international trade system, they tend to form trade groups where all members have a 
chance of benefiting. When a trade group is formed with a dominant Hub member, the 
other members tend to flounder while the Hub country flourishes. 
An Alternative Understanding of the lnterna tional System 
This thesis contains three substantive departures fiom the previous scholarship in 
IR. First, we do not consider the international system as a single macro system nor do we 
consider it as a combination of separate submacro systems, nor do we consider it as a 
combination of separate dyadic interactions, but we approach the international system 
holistically, as a combination of these three different levels. Submacro system politics 
and power positioning affect the dynamics of the macro system, and we especially 
consider the consequences of such possibilities for understanding the international 
system. These submacro systems interact and overlap with each other through the Hubs 
that glue together the macro system. 
This brings us to our second departure fiom traditional IR: rather than pre- 
determining the identity of the submacro structure, we identify and investigate latent 
cliques of countries to determine the nature of power in international relationships. In 
other words, we consider latent cliques of countries rather than formalized communities 
of countries. There are a whole slew of formalized submacro systems - trade blocs, 
political alliances, cultural communities, geographic groups - that have each received 
separate analyses. Instead of considering just one type of these formalized submacro 
systems, we recognize a range of types, and we must search for the commonalities among 
these systems. Therefore, to observe basic submacro system dynamics, instead of 
examining the formalized country communities, we examine country cliques latent within 
the larger system. While it is true that we look at dyadic trade relationships to determine 
these cliques, we find country cliques that were not necessarily formally grouped by a 
regional trade pact or by a trade accord.lo8 Like formalized subsystems, latent cliques 
interact with each other and include members that are involved in other cliques. As a 
result of interactions among these submacro cliques, higher-level, macro system 
interactions are affected. 
Our third and most substantial departure from previous scholarship is that we 
implement graph theory as a methodology. Applying graph theory to other recognized 
systems in international politics may hrther help us understand the contours of the 
international system, but it may also help us better understand dyadic relationships 
between two countries, or it may help us identify how non-country (third image) actors 
affect countries. 
These departures help us discover many interesting findings, with important 
ramifications for IR, as well as for policy-crafting. In Chapter 3, we found that the macro 
level system of trade most closely resembles a Scale-Free Network. Therefore, macro 
system stability is highly dependent upon the health of a few Hub countries. Random 
shocks are unlikely to affect these Hub countries, however, targeted shocks against these 
Hubs may throw the international economy into depression. Along these lines, 
considering the international hierarchy, we find that contagion should typically only 
spread horizontally or from the top-down: only in rare circumstances may contagion 
percolate from the bottom-up. The presence of a Scale-Free Network also suggests that 
hierarchical properties of the international system cannot be captured without an analysis 
of the submacro system. To identify the hierarchy of the international trade system, in 
Chapter 4 we examined the latent cliques of the trade network. 
log The findings of the embedded subsystems reflect well upon formalized subsystems: some subsystems 
have dominant partners necessary for the equilibrium of the system, while other systems equally share the 
burden of stability (and the corresponding power). 
Through an investigation of these latent cliques, in Chapter 5 we find that there 
are many different forms of interdependence among the submacro systems, leading us to 
believe that the hierarchy of international trade is Multiscalar. Some submacro systems 
have a dominant Hub, while other systems have several Hubs, while others simply 
contain a group of equal countries. In Chapter 6, we find that these variations of 
interdependence have noticeable impacts on formalized trade groups as well, with utility 
of the trade bloc for its member countries in improving relative positions and increasing 
trade, seemingly dependent upon the interdependence of the countries. 
Future Possibilities 
Throughout this thesis, we have discussed possible extensions for graph theory- 
based methods in political science and in IR. In this section, we contain our discussion to 
the possible extensions of this project. In terms of methodology, some of these queries 
would be best served with graph theoretic techniques combined with traditional statistical 
approaches, while others would benefit most from a combination of statistical analysis 
and case studies. We shall let the future researcher decide which tools are appropriate to 
answer which questions, but we would especially encourage the researcher to investigate 
the full possibilities contained within graph theory. Having made the plug, let us 
continue by examining possible extensions of research. 
The most immediate extension to this project would involve classifying each of 
the submacro systems over the past forty years along a gradient of interdependence, 
ranging from Pure-Dependent to Equal-Dependent. To accomplish this task, we must 
recognize that such analysis is measuring homophily, and there are several approaches 
we could take. One may wish to apply to each of the submacro systems the same 
technique of degree distribution analysis that we implemented to inspect the macro 
system. However, as we noted earlier, this method does not currently reveal when a 
Scale-Free Network becomes a Hegemonic System, and therefore may not show when a 
Multi-Dependent Submacro System becomes a Pure-Dependent Submacro  stern.'^^ 
One may therefore be inclined to use clustering coefficients or intra-clique trade as well. 
After defining the various latent cliques, another useful exercise would be to 
investigate whether certain types of these embedded cliques give rise to formalized trade 
blocs more frequently than other embedded cliques. One hypothesis worth testing is 
whether trade blocs only succeed in conditions of a certain form of subsystem 
interdependence - when all the nations are relatively equal in terms of trade and in terms 
of their relative locations within the international system. ' l o  Alternatively, trade blocs 
may form more frequently among cliques that are heavily sheltered from outside 
involvement. 
Among these trade blocs, some are composed of equal partners while other trade 
blocs contain partners that seem Hub-like compared to their trade bloc counterparts. A 
worthwhile investigation would involve examining trade blocs, and possibly other 
established submacro system groupings such as geographic regions, to see whether power 
variation only occurs in latent cliques or whether it is endemic to all submacro systems, 
formal and informal alike. 
After defining the various latent cliques along the interdependent gradient, one 
may also wish to reconsider the macro system. Being able to classify the embedded 
109 One solution may be to define Hegemonies only when their degree distributions are outliers relative to 
other observations. 
110 Meaning their locations within both the macro system and the several subsystems that each country may 
be involved within. 
cliques, one should be able to better classify the macro system and how it has changed 
over time. To this end, another interesting research project would include examining 
whether the prevalence of certain subsystem formations give rise to certain macro system 
formations, and vice versa. For instance, when the macro system becomes more 
Egalitarian, we may see a rise in the number of Equal-Dependent submacro systems; and 
when more subsystems become Pure-Dependent, we may be able to predict the onset of 
macro s ystem-level Hegemony. 
Future researchers should also wish to examine the implications of overlapping 
cliques. In our analysis, the United States was often the Gatekeeper between two cliques. 
Sometimes another type of nation may become the Gatekeeper between two cliques, 
especially in non-trade international systems. ' During the 1980s, Afghanistan was 
sought after by both the Soviet Union and the United States, receiving healthy amounts of 
aid from both sides. Even when the Soviet Union invaded, the United States quickly 
came to Afghanistan's defense, showing the benefits of sitting between two submacro 
groups. Oppositely, Huntington warns us that we should be especially concerned for the 
Gatekeepers that sit along the fault lines of cultures (1 996). 
Finally, throughout this project, we have only examined networks with undirected 
edges. Trade does include directional flows, however, and analyzing relationships, not 
just in terrns of trade amounts, but also in terms of direction, may shed more light on the 
international trade system. An analysis would be particularly interesting on this front if it 
11 1 Some specific trade relationship case studies would be well worth the undertaking. In the 1500s, a small 
state in South India, Kerala, produced most of the world's spices, developing trade relations with several 
stronger powers. Kerala is now renowned for its high levels of social development and its healthy 
government. At a time when colonizers were dividing and conquering the rest of India, Kerala's success 
may stem fiom the strong institutions which the competing powers installed as a result of Kerala's 
Gatekeeper position. 
tested the flow of something else along with trade, such as the flow of democracy or the 
flow of social values. Trade may aid the flow of such ideas and beliefs. Would the flows 
be different within different structures of the international system? 
Conclusion 
In this thesis, several ideas have been explored and several questions have been 
generated. In the terms of the future of IR, we hope to see more research that examines 
subsystems in the context of the macro and international systems, and we also hope to see 
more research that utilizes graph theory. Research along such lines will prove fruitfbl as 
it may help us test a whole host of propositions arising from international systems theory 
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APPENDIX A: SOME NOTES ON DATA METHODOLOGY 
In this project, we originally sought to answer the question: "what is the 
While this question lacked direction and purpose, we started considering 
graph theory and trade while seeking to answer it. Eventually, we realized that a question 
would not be a practical way of fiaming the research contained in the preceding pages as 
a question usually implies a thesis, and in this work, we present system structures rather 
than an argument. 
To get to the point of identifying the international system, much needed to be 
done with data. All export data was compiled fiom UN Comtrade data from 1962- 
2003."~ We excluded 2004 because not all trade relationships had been reported at the 
time of the analysis, while we started our observations with 1962 as this was the earliest 
year that Comtrade offered. In order to compile the data online, Behram Mistree wrote a 
computer program which interacted with the Comtrade website, and then gathered and 
sorted the information. The program was then instructed to remove observations that 
were not countries. For instance, the data includes "Special Categories," "Asia, nes," and 
the South Afhcan Customs Union, all of which were not countries. These were all 
removed. ' 
Following the collection and programmed processing of the data, the data was 
further processed. Finding certain quirks in the data, we had to combine varying labels 
for the same country: for instance, where India had not been included due to a labeling 
-- -- - 
112 This question was constructed by Behram. 
113 We used the online database, but we checked several of the numbers against the print edition of 
Comtrade. We also used the print edition to add observations for the Soviet Union, which were 
inexplicably missing from the online datasets. 
114 It should be noted that during part of the research, the program was not fool-proof and we did have to go 
back by hand and delete several observations. 
difference in the earlier years, we renamed "India, excl. Sikkim," which was present at 
that point, as "India;" where the label for the United States before 1981 was listed as 
"USA (before 1981)" we switched it to "USA." A complete list of terminology 
adjustments is presented in the table below. Other from these changes, the data in our 
datasets entirely reflects what is contained in the US Comtrade database? 
115 The data in the online Corntrade database and the data in the published version of the Corntrade database 
are reasonably similar with the notable exception that some observations for the USSR are not in the online 
version. We manually added these observations. 
Afier organizing the data, we placed it in four different formats. First, we made 
dyadic relationships of every major trade relationship between every country fiom 1962- 
2003. We made two separate sets of these dyadic relationships, one where we included 
and indicated non-existent relationships, and another set where we excluded relationships 
that were zero. These dyadic relationships were especially useful for running CFinder, 
Netdraw, and Pajek. 
The second format was laid out to show the average number of degrees for each 
country over time. Just eye-balling the figures in the average degree lists fiom 1962- 
2003 shows many interesting patterns: for instance, Saudi Arabia and several other oil 
countries excel while other countries lose trade independency. We plan on using this data 
for future studies. 
In the third format, we listed the nodal clustering coefficient for each country over 
time. Given three countries where A and B trade, and B and C trade, he nodal clustering 
coefficient shows the likelihood that A and C trade. This is determined along the 
following equation: 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ~ * i -  11 t ~ - i : ~ ~ ~ ; ; l ~ -  c 9 t l 1 ~ ~ ~ ! + t * t  1 q 1 1  1 1  X - I ~ - I ( ~ X  j 
r ', 
i ~ l l l l l l ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  1 1 1  h-l1*bl,.% c . ~ q , t t . l . t * f l  ! . 1 * j d 6 ~ ~  1 (From Newman, 2003). 
In order to determine the overall clustering coefficient of the network rather than 
the node, we looked at the average clustering coefficient of each year. 
In the final format, we listed the average degree of separation for every country 
over time. The average degree of separation is computed by counting the number of 
relationships divided by the number of relationships possible. The nodal average degree 
of separation gave rise to the worldwide average degree of separation, and to the 
normalized average degree of separation. One of the big challenges with our data was 
that from 1962-2003, several new countries formed and began to flourish. To normalize 
the average degree of separation, we divided by the total number of countries involved 
during that year. The values of the normalized average degrees of separation for the 
international system are displayed in the table below. 
After our data was prepared in these three formats, our data was stored in 
Microsoft Excel files and textfiles. We especially had to put the dyadic data into textfiles 
so that CFinder, Netdraw, and Pajek could read them. In order to identify submacro 
cliques, we would take the data in a given year, organize it so that it could be read by 
CFinder, and then ran CFinder. Less than a second after running the program, CFinder 
would list several cliques and would provide initial graphing.'16 When these graphs were 
simple enough to follow, they were used. If the graph images were not easily readable, 
we would filter the original data using either Excel or Stata to include only the country 
relationships pertinent to visually representing the clique that had already been identified. 
Then we would organize the data for Netdraw or Pajek, both established computer 
programs for graphing networks. We chose Netdraw and Pajek over other software 
CFinder was consistent in the number of communities it produced. 
(notably GraphViz) because they both were easier to use and were both compatible with 
windows.' l7  
Once the graph data was entered in Netdraw or Pajek, we would run a spring 
embedding function to display the network. The spring embedding function seeks to 
minimize the distance of all of the edges in a network while allowing a certain amount of 
space between the nodes. Each program makes available several different display 
functions; we experimented with several of these before deciding on the spring 
embedding function. We would also weight the size of the edges based upon the natural 
logarithm of the export amount. 
117 Netdraw seems to be based upon Pajek. In our experience, it had a better user interface and ran better 
than Pajek. 
APPENDIX B: A LIST OF THE MEMBERS OF TRADE 
BLOCS AND THEIR YEARS OF ACCESSION 
In Chapter 6, we discuss the effects of trade blocs on various member states. The 
countries we included in each trade bloc are listed in the table below, with their years of 
accession. This table is derived from the UNCTAD Handbook on Statistics (2006). 
EUROPE: 
I I 
Group Year of 
Accession 
EFTA (European Free Trade Association) 3 
1 France I 2002 
Iceland 
Norway 
Switzerland 
Euro Zone (of EU) 12 
1 Germany I 2002 
1960 
1960 
1960 
Austria 
Belgium 
Finland 
I Greece I 2002 
2002 
2002 
2002 
1 Ireland I 2002 
1 Italy I 2002 
I Portugal I 2002 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
I Spain I 2002 
2002 
2002 
I EU (European Union) 25 
I Estonia I 2004 
Austria 
Belgium 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic 
Denmark 
1995 
1957 
2004 
2004 
1973 
AMERICAS: 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Greece 
Hungary 
Ireland 
Italy 
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Luxembourg 
Malta 
Netherlands 
Poland 
Portugal 
Slovakia 
Slovenia 
Spain 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
1995 
1957 
1957 
1981 
2004 
1973 
1957 
2004 
2004 
1957 
2004 
1957 
2004 
1986 
2004 
2004 
1986 
1995 
1973 
Group 
I Colombia I 1996 
Year of 
Accession 
Andean Group (ANCOM) 5 
I Ecuador I 1996 
Bolivia 
1 Peru I 1996 
1996 
1 Venezuela I 1996 
CACM (Central American Common Market) 5 
I Costa Rica I 1962 
I El Salvador I 1961 
I Guatemala I 1961 
I CARICOM (Caribbean Communitv) 15 
Honduras 
Nicaragua 
1961 
1961 
I Barbados I 1973 
Antigua and Barbuda 
Bahamas 
1974 
1983 
I Grenada I 1974 
Belize 
Dominica 
1974 
1974 
1 Jamaica 1 1973 
Guyana 
Haiti 
I Montserrat 1 1974 
1973 
1997 
- 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 
Saint Lucia 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
1974 
1974 
1974 
- 
Suriname 
Trinidad and Tobago 
( Bahamas I 1994 
1995 
1973 
FTAA (Free Trade Area of the Americas) 34 
I Barbados I 1994 
Antigua and Barbuda 
Argentina 
I Belize 1 1994 
1994 
1994 
I Bolivia I 1994 
1 Brazil I 1994 
I Canada I 1994 
I Costa Rica I 1994 
Chile 
Colombia 
1994 
1994 
I Grenada I 1994 
Dominica 
Dominican Republic 
Ecuador 
El Salvador 
I Guatemala I 1994 
1994 
1994 
1994 
1994 
I Guyana I 1994 
1 Haiti I 1994 
I Honduras I 1994 
I Jamaica I 1994 
I Mexico I 1994 
I 
Nicaragua 1994 
Panama 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 
Saint Lucia 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
Suriname 
Trinidad and Tobago 
United States of America 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
1994 
1994 
1994 
1994 
1994 
1994 
1994 
1994 
1994 
1994 
1994 
M I A  (Latin American Integration Association) 12 
Argentina 
Bolivia 
Brazil 
Chile 
Colombia 
Cuba 
Ecuador 
Mexico 
Paraguay 
Peru 
Uruguay 
Venezuela 
1980 
1980 
1980 
1980 
1980 
1980 
1980 
1980 
1980 
1980 
1980 
1980 
MERCOSUR (Southern Common Market) 4 
Argentina 
Brazil 
Paraguay 
Uruguay 
1994 
1994 
1994 
1994 
NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) 3 
Canada 
Mexico 
United States of America 
1992 
1992 
1992 
OECS (Organization of Eastern Caribbean States) 9 
Anguilla 
Antigua and Barbuda 
1995 
1981 
British Virgin Islands 
Dominica 
Grenada 
Montsenat 
Saint Kitts and Nevis 
Saint Lucia 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 
1984 
1981 
1981 
1981 
1981 
1981 
1981 
LFRICA: 
Group 
CEMAC, former UDEAC(Centra1 Afvican Customs 
and Economic Union) 6 
Year of 
Accession 
Cameroon 
Central African Republic 
Chad 
Gabon I 1994 
1994 
1994 
1994 
Congo 
Equatorial Guinea 
1994 
1994 
Democratic Republic of the Congo I 1976 
CEPGL (Economic Community ofthe Great Lakes 
Countries) 3 
Rwanda I 1976 
Burundi 1976 
Burundi I 1994 
COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern 
Africa) 19 
Comoros I 1994 
Angola 
Democratic Republic of the Congo I 1994 
1994 
Djibouti I 1994 
Kenya 1 1994 
Eritrea 
Ethiopia 
1994 
1994 
Madagascar 1994 
I Seychelles I 1994 
Malawi 
Mauritius 
Rwanda 
1 Sudan 1 1994 
1994 
1994 
1994 
I Swaziland I 1994 
I Uganda I 1994 
I Zambia I 1994 
I Zimbabwe I 1994 
ECCAS (Economic Community of Central African 
States) 11 
I Chad I 1983 
Angola 
Burundi 
Cameroon 
Central African Republic 
1999 
1983 
1983 
1983 
I Gabon I 1983 
Congo 
Democratic Republic of the Congo 
Equatorial Guinea 
I Rwanda I 1983 
1983 
1983 
1983 
I Sao Tome and Principe I 1983 
ECO WAS (Economic Community of West African 
States) I5 
I Gambia I 1975 
Benin 
Burkina Faso 
Cape Verde 
CGte d'Ivoire 
1975 
1975 
1977 
1975 
I Liberia I 1975 
Ghana 
Guinea 
Guinea-Bissau 
I Mali I 1975 
1975 
1975 
1975 
Niger 
Nigeria 
Senegal 
Sierra Leone 
1975 
1975 
1975 
1975 
I Liberia I 1973 
MRU (Mano River Union) 3 
Guinea 1973 
Sierra Leone 1973 
SADC (Southern African Development Community) 14 
Angola 
Botswana 
Democratic Republic of the Congo 
I Mozambique I 1992 
1992 
1992 
1992 
Lesotho 
Malawi 
Mauritius 
1992 
1992 
1992 
I South A h c a  I 1994 
Namibia 
Seychelles 
1 Swaziland I 1992 
1992 
1992 
I UEMOA (West African Economic and Monetary 
United Republic of Tanzania 
Zambia 
Zimbabwe 
1992 
1992 
1992 
I Burkina Faso I 1994 
Union) 8 
I CGte d 'Ivoire I 1994 
Benin 
I Guinea-Bissau I 1994 
1994 
I Mali I 1994 
1 Niger 1994 
Senegal 
Togo 
1994 
1994 
- 
UMA (Arab Maghreb Union) 5 
Algeria 
Libyan Arab Jamahiriya 
Mauritania 
Morocco 
Tunisia 
1989 
1989 
1989 
1989 
1989 
Group 
I Cambodia I 1999 
Year of 
Accession 
ASEAN (Association of South-East Asian Nations) 10 
Brunei Darussalam 
I Malaysia I 1967 
1984 
Indonesia 
Lao People's Democratic Republic 
1 Myanmar I 1997 
1967 
1997 
I Thailand 1 1967 
Philippines 
Singapore 
I Viet Nam I 1995 
1967 
1967 
I China I 2001 
Bangkok Agreement 6 
I India I 1975 
Bangladesh 1975 
I Sri Lanka I 1975 
Lao People's Democratic Republic 
Republic of Korea 
1975 
1975 
I Azerbaiian I 1992 
ECO (Economic Cooperation Organization) 10 
Afghanistan 
1 Kyrgyzstan 1992 
1992 
Iran, Islamic Republic of 
Kazakhstan 
I Pakistan I 1985 
1985 
1992 
Tajikistan 
Turkey 
Turkmenistan 
I GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) 6 
1992 
1985 
1992 
Uzbekistan 1992 
INTERREGIONAL: 
Bahrain 1981 
Kuwait 1981 
Trade Group 
Oman 
Qatar 
Saudi Arabia 
United Arab Emirates 
Year of 
Accession 
1981 
1981 
1981 
1981 
I Brunei Darussalam I 1989 
MSG (Melanesia Spearhead Group) 4 
APEC (Asia-Paczfic Economic Cooperation) 21 
I Canada I 1989 
Fiji 
Papua New Guinea 
Solomon Islands 
Vanuatu 
Australia 
1 Chile I 1994 
1996 
1988 
1988 
1988 
1989 
I China I 1991 
- -- I China, Hong Kong SAR 1991 
SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional 
Cooperation) 7 
I China, Taiwan Province of I 1991 
Bangladesh 
Bhutan 
India 
Maldives 
Nepal 
Pakistan 
Sri Lanka 
1 Indonesia I 1989 
1985 
1985 
1985 
1985 
1985 
1985 
1985 
Japan 
Malaysia 
Mexico 
1989 
1989 
1993 
I Peru I 1998 
New Zealand 
P a ~ u a  New Guinea 
1989 
1993 
I Russian Federation I 1998 
Philippines 
Republic of Korea 
1989 
1989 
I United States of America I 1989 
Singapore 
Thailand 
I Viet Nam I 1998 
1989 
1989 
BSEC (Black Sea Economic Cooperation) 1 I 
Albania 
Armenia 
Azerbaijan 
Bulgaria 
1992 
1992 
1992 
1992 
Georgia 
Greece 
1992 
1992 
Moldova, Republic of 
Romania 
Russian Federation 
1992 
1992 
1992 
Turkey 
Ukraine 
I Georgia I 1993 
1992 
1992 
CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) 12 
1 Kazakhstan 1 1991 
Armenia 
Azerbaij an 
Belarus 
1991 
1991 
1991 
I Republic of Moldova I 1991 
I 
Kyrgyzstan 
I Ukraine 1 1991 
1991 
Russian Federation 
Tajikistan 
Turkmenistan 
1991 
1991 
1991 
Uzbekistan 1991 
